Babies Jessica, Richard, and Emily: The Need for Legislative Reform of Adoption Laws by Rosenman, Andrew S.
Chicago-Kent Law Review 
Volume 70 
Issue 4 Symposium on Ancient Law, Economics 
& Society Part I: The Development of Law in 
Classical and Early Medieval Europe / 
Symposium on Ancient Law, Economics & 
Society Part I: The Development of Law in the 
Ancient Near East 
Article 18 
June 1995 
Babies Jessica, Richard, and Emily: The Need for Legislative 
Reform of Adoption Laws 
Andrew S. Rosenman 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Andrew S. Rosenman, Babies Jessica, Richard, and Emily: The Need for Legislative Reform of Adoption 
Laws, 70 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1851 (1995). 
Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview/vol70/iss4/18 
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Chicago-Kent Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons @ IIT 
Chicago-Kent College of Law. For more information, please contact jwenger@kentlaw.iit.edu, 
ebarney@kentlaw.iit.edu. 
BABIES JESSICA, RICHARD, AND EMILY:




"There were no winners in this case."' Unfortunately, this sad
portrayal of the much-publicized adoption2 case of Baby Jessica 3 is
both accurate and applicable to several other adoption cases. Along
with Baby Jessica, the recent cases of Baby Richard 4 in Illinois and
Baby Emily5 in Florida illustrate the need for immediate legislative
reform of state adoption laws. After Jessica spent the first twenty-
nine months of her life with her adoptive parents, she was forced to
begin a new life with her natural parents. Although Richard spent all
but four days of his life with his adoptive parents, he was "returned"
to his natural parents more than four years after his birth. Emily was
twenty-seven months old before the first appeal of her adoption case
was finally completed; her adoption was eventually upheld.
Regrettably, Jessica, Richard, and Emily are innocent victims of
complicated and bitter legal battles between natural and adoptive par-
ents. Yet, innocent children should never be forced to bear the emo-
tional burdens of such custody disputes. "There is little that can be as
detrimental to a child's sound development as uncertainty over
* J.D. with High Honors, 1995. I would like to thank Professor Sarah R. Bensinger for
her insightful feedback and tireless enthusiasm during the writing and editing of this article.
1. Too Much Love, Pain for Jessica, PLAIN DEALER, Aug. 6, 1993, at 4B.
2. Adoption is generally defined as the procedure by which "an adult and child become
legally related to each other in the same respect as birth parents and children." ALAN SUSSMAN
& MARTIN GUGGENHEIM, THE RIGHTS OF PARENTS 175 (1980).
3. While Jessica was not the child's birth name, for purposes of clarity, this Note will refer
to her as Jessica, the name given her by the adoptive parents. Jessica's natural parents renamed
her Anna a few months after they regained custody of her. See Mary Neubauer, No Longer
'Little Jessica, 3-Year-Old Reclaimed by Mother, Now is 'Anna', Cm. TRIB., Mar. 11, 1994, (Eve-
ning Update), at 2.
4. Richard was a fictitious name used by the Illinois Appellate Court to anonymously de-
scribe the baby boy who was the subject of that case. In re Doe, 627 N.E.2d 648, 649 n.1 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1993), rev'd, 638 N.E.2d 181 (Ill.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 499, and cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
499 (1994) [hereinafter Doe 1].
5. Although the child's natural father refers to her as Ashley, court documents, the media,
and her adoptive parents call her Emily. The natural mother originally called her child "Hope"
because she hoped the child would have a good life. See Mike Wilson, Baby Emily: Whose Life
is This Anyway?, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Jan. 24, 1995, at IA.
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whether he is to remain in his current 'home,' under the care of his
parents or foster parents, especially when such uncertainty is pro-
longed." 6 This is particularly true when the child has spent his or her
entire life with one family, only to be removed later to a new family
with whom the child has had no contact. Jessica and Richard typify
this problem; Emily will avoid a similar fate.
This Note will outline the myriad problems that arose in these
three cases and propose legislative reforms to prevent such tragic
cases from re-occurring. Parts I, II, and III will track the complicated
procedural and factual histories of the three principal cases. Parts IV
and V will focus on the frequent conflict between the putative7 fa-
ther's rights and the "best interests of the child." 8 Those two sections
will also discuss the three principal cases and the competing interests
of the natural and adoptive parents in each instance. Finally, Part VI
will discuss four proposed legislative reforms: (1) expedited decisions
and appeals; (2) putative father registries; (3) mandatory preplace-
ment counseling; and (4) penalties for fraud.
Each of the proposed reforms will benefit the adoption process.
First, expedited court decisions and appeals will ensure that final
placement of the child takes place as quickly as possible. Second, a
putative father registry will enable the putative father to protect his
parental rights before the child is placed with adoptive parents, even if
the natural mother attempts to conceal the adoption. Third,
mandatory preplacement counseling will ensure that the natural
mother places her child for adoption with informed consent. Fourth,
punishing fraud will discourage the natural mother from fraudulently
concealing the natural father's identity; such concealment is the cause
of many adoption battles. Thus, the proposed reforms balance the in-
terests of natural and adoptive parents but also protect the child's
well-being.
I. BABY JESSICA
On February 8, 1991, Cara Clausen, an unmarried Iowa woman,
gave birth to a baby girl who later became known as Jessica DeBoer.9
6. Lehman v. Lycoming County Children's Servs. Agency, 458 U.S. 502, 513-14 (1982).
7. A "putative father" is "[t]he alleged gr reputed father of a child born out of wedlock."
BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1237 (6th ed. 1990).
8. "Best interests of the child" is a legal term of art and the factors relevant in making that
determination vary from court to court. Judy E. Nathan, Note, Visitation After Adoption: In the
Best Interests of the Child, 59 N.Y.U. L REV. 633, 633 n.2 (1984).
9. See supra note 3.
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Two days later, the baby was given up for adoption by Cara, and Scott
Seefeldt, the man Cara named as the baby's natural father, executed a
release of custody form four days later.10 On February 25, 1991,
Roberta and Jan DeBoer filed an adoption petition" in juvenile court
in Iowa. 12 At a court hearing' 3 held the same day, the parental rights
of Cara and Scott were terminated.' 4 In addition, the DeBoers were
granted custody of Jessica and returned with her to their home in Ann
Arbor, Michigan.
15
On March 6, 1991, Cara filed a request in the Iowa juvenile court
to revoke, on several grounds, her consent to the adoption.' 6 Primar-
ily, she claimed that she had lied by naming Scott Seefeldt as the natu-
ral father and that Daniel Schmidt was Jessica's actual father. 17 Later
that month, Daniel filed an affidavit of paternity and sought to inter-
vene in the DeBoers' adoption proceeding on the grounds that he had
never consented to the adoption.' 8 The Iowa district court ordered
blood tests, which ultimately revealed that there was a 99.9% chance
that Daniel was the biological father and a 0% chance that Scott was
the biological father. 19
As a result of the blood tests, the Iowa district court ruled in late
1991 that Daniel's parental rights had not been terminated and that he
10. See In re Clausen, 501 N.W.2d 193, 194 (Mich. Ct. App.) (per curiam), afftd, 502 N.W.2d
649 (Mich. 1993) [hereinafter Clausen 1].
11. Typically, an adoption petition sets forth background information regarding the child
and both sets of parents and asks the court to approve the adoption. MORTON L. LEAVY & Roy
D. WErNBERG, LAW OF ADOPTION 32 (4th ed. 1979). The DeBoers sought to adopt Jessica be-
cause they were infertile. See Court Asked to Act on Baby Jessica Case, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER,
July 22, 1993, at 4.
12. Clausen 1, 501 N.W.2d at 194.
13. A court hearing is conducted to determine whether the contemplated adoption is a
proper one. Courts will usually examine all available information in making their decisions. See,
e.g., LEAVY & WEN1BERG, supra note 11, at 50.
14. In re B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d 239, 241 (Iowa 1992).
15. Cara and Scott received notice of the hearing but waived their right to attend. Id.
16. Cara claimed that the release of her parental rights was procured by fraud, coercion,
and misrepresentation. She also argued that she had "good cause" for revoking her consent
because her release of custody was obtained 40 hours after birth, in violation of Iowa law. Id. at
242. The relevant portion of the Iowa statute requires that a release of custody "be signed, not
less than seventy-two hours after the birth of the child to be released, by all living parents."
IOWA CODE ANN. § 600A.4(2)(d) (West 1981).
17. Cara stated that she lied because "she was dating Scott at the time she found out that
she was pregnant, and she did not want to create problems by appearing to have another man's
baby." B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d at 246. Cara's fraud is especially troubling because her actions set in
motion the lengthy custody battle which caused emotional strain on all parties involved, espe-
cially Jessica. The use of fraud is discussed infra notes 233-57 and accompanying text.
18. Clausen I, 501 N.W.2d at 194.
19. The DeBoers, doubting Cara's truthfulness regarding the biological father, objected to




had not consented to Jessica's adoption.20 Therefore, the court found
that Daniel (who had married Cara during the proceedings) was enti-
tled to custody of Jessica and ordered that Jessica be returned to the
Schmidts. 21 At this stage in the litigation, Jessica was rapidly ap-
proaching her first birthday. The legal battle was not even close to
ending, however. Appeals were taken to the Iowa Court of Appeals 22
and then to the Iowa Supreme Court, which affirmed the Court of
Appeals' ruling on September 23, 1992.23 At this point, Jessica was
already nineteen months old. In its opinion, the Iowa Supreme Court
maintained that its decision did not invalidate an adoption decree:
"Adoption of the baby was denied by the district court because the
father's rights were not terminated. ' 24 The court also refused to con-
sider the issue of Jessica's best interests, emphasizing that "[c]ourts
are not free to take children from parents simply by deciding another
home offers more advantages. '25
Approximately two months later, the Iowa Supreme Court de-
nied the DeBoers' motion to reconsider and remanded the case to the
district court to issue an order changing physical custody to the
Schmidts. 26 After the DeBoers failed to appear before the Iowa dis-
trict court on December 3, 1992, the district court "found that the
DeBoers had no legal right or claim to physical custody of the child"
and scheduled another hearing for the DeBoers to show cause why
they should not be held in contempt.27 By this time, Jessica was nearly
twenty-two months old.
On December 3, 1992, the day their rights were terminated in
Iowa, the DeBoers sought refuge in the Michigan courts. They filed a
petition in Washtenaw County Circuit Court pursuant to the Uniform
20. The district court also rejected the DeBoers' arguments that Daniel was an unfit parent
and had abandoned Jessica because the DeBoers failed to prove each of these claims by "clear
and convincing" evidence. Id.
21. B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d at 241.
22. The Iowa Court of Appeals' opinion is unreported. That court ruled only that Cara's
parental rights were not terminated, and, therefore, the court refused to consider the validity of
the DeBoers' adoption petition. Id.
23. Id. at 246.
24. Id. at 241. In addition, the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the district court's findings
that Daniel was neither an unfit parent nor had abandoned Jessica under Iowa law. Id. at 246.
25. Id. at 241 (quoting In re Burney, 259 N.W.2d 322, 324 (Iowa 1977)).
26. Clausen I, 501 N.W.2d 193, 195 (Mich. Ct. App.) (per curiam), affd, 502 N.W.2d 649
(Mich. 1993).
27. Id. That hearing was held on January 22, 1993, and resulted in the DeBoers being held
in contempt of court for failing to appear and failing to return Jessica to the Schmidts. Id. at 195
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Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA)28 seeking to modify the
Iowa order granting custody to the Schmidts.29 Daniel Schmidt then
filed a motion for summary disposition and sought to enforce the Iowa
judgment in Michigan. 30 On January 11, 1993, however, less than one
month before Jessica's second birthday, the Washtenaw County Cir-
cuit Court denied the motion and ordered that Jessica remain with the
DeBoers.
31
Jessica's second birthday came and went. On March 29, 1993, the
Michigan Court of Appeals reversed the Washtenaw County Circuit
Court's decision, holding that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to
intervene in the case.32 The court noted that the UCCJA was
designed to "avoid jurisdictional competition between states by estab-
lishing uniform rules for deciding when states have jurisdiction to
make child custody determinations. ' 33 Additionally, the Court of Ap-
peals held that the DeBoers lacked standing as third parties to initiate
a custody action because the Iowa decisions stripped them of any legal
claim to Jessica.34
The DeBoers appealed to the Michigan Supreme Court, which
affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision on July 2, 1993.3 5 By now,
28. MIcH. COMP. LAWS AN. §§ 600.651-673 (West 1981). The purpose of the UCCJA is to
promote interstate cooperation and avoid jurisdictional conflicts by granting jurisdiction to the
state that has the most contacts with the child. With few exceptions, the UCCJA obligates sister
states to enforce custody determinations made by the state that has proper jurisdiction. All fifty
states and the District of Columbia have adopted the UCCJA. See James C. Murray, Comment,
One Child's Odyssey Through the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Parental Kidnapping
Prevention Acts, 1993 Wis. L. REV. 589, 591. Some of these states, however, enacted the UCCJA
with modifications that encouraged dissatisfied, noncustodial parents to forum shop for a state
more favorable to their goals. See Linda Lea M. Viken, Calling in the Feds: The Need for an
Impartial Referee in Interstate Child Custody Disputes, 39 S.D. L. REV. 469, 473 (1994).
29. Clausen 1, 501 N.W.2d at 195. The DeBoers claimed that Michigan had jurisdiction as
Jessica's "home state" under the UCCJA because Jessica had lived in Michigan for all but 17
days of her life and because it would be in her best interests for Michigan to exercise jurisdiction.
Id.; see also MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.653(1)(a), (b).
30. Clausen I, 501 N.W.2d at 195.
31. Id. at 196. In a subsequent hearing on the best interests of the child, the Washtenaw
County Circuit Court held that it was indeed in Jessica's best interests to remain in the custody
of the DeBoers. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. Since the case was pending in Iowa courts first, the court of appeals noted that
Michigan courts were precluded under the UCCJA from exercising concurrent jurisdiction. Id.
at 197.
34. Id. at 197.
35. In re Clausen, 502 N.W.2d 649, 668 (Mich. 1993) (per curiam) [hereinafter Clausen II].
Justice Levin filed a lengthy dissent in which he sharply criticized the majority for ignoring Jes-
sica's best interests:
I would agree with the majority's analysis if the DeBoers had gone to Iowa [and]
purchased a carload of hay .... But this is not a lawsuit concerning the ownership, the
legal title, to a bale of hay. This is not the usual A v. B lawsuit; Schmidts v. DeBoers, or,
if you prefer, DeBoers v. Schmidts. There is a C, the child.
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Jessica was almost two and a half years old. The Michigan Supreme
Court based its holding on two independent grounds. First, the court
held that Michigan courts lacked jurisdiction under both the UCCJA
and the Federal Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA) 36 to de-
cide the case. 37 Second, it affirmed the Court of Appeals' ruling that
the DeBoers did not have standing to bring a custody action.38 The
Michigan Supreme Court also noted that the refusal by the Iowa
courts to employ a "best interests of the child" standard did not en-
able Michigan's courts simply to ignore the Iowa custody orders. 39
Finally, the DeBoers appealed to the United States Supreme
Court to stay enforcement of the Michigan Supreme Court's decision.
The application was initially heard by Justice Stevens in his role as
Circuit Justice for the Sixth Circuit.40 Justice Stevens denied the
DeBoers' request because there was neither a reasonable probability
that the other Justices would grant certiorari, nor a "fair prospect"
that if the Court did hear the case, it would conclude that the decision
below was erroneous.41 Justice Stevens subsequently referred the ap-
plications to the full court which, in a 6-2 decision 42 issued on July 30,
1993, also refused to stay the Michigan Supreme Court's decision.43
After a twenty-nine-month legal fight, Jessica returned to Iowa with
the Schmidts on August 3, 1993. 44
Id. at 668-69 (Levin, J., dissenting).
36. 28 U.S.C. § 1738(A) (1980). The PKPA is a federal law that imposes a duty on all states
to enforce a child custody determination entered by a court of a sister state as long as the deter-
mination is consistent with the PKPA's provisions. See Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174,
175-76 (1988). "When the UCCJA and PKPA conflict, the preemptive federal PKPA controls."
Atkins v. Atkins, 823 S.W.2d 816, 819 (Ark. 1992).
37. Clausen 11, 502 N.W.2d at 652.
38. Id.
39. "[The UCCJA and PKPA] do not provide that a best interests of the child standard is
the substantive test by which all custody decisions are to be made." Id. at 661.
40. See DeBoer v. DeBoer, 114 S. Ct. 1 (Stevens, Circuit Justice 1993).
41. Id. Justice Stevens also emphasized that "[n]either Iowa law, Michigan law, nor federal
law authorizes unrelated persons to retain custody of a child whose natural parents have not
been found to be unfit simply because they may be better able to provide for her future and her
education." Id. at 2.
42. The Court had only eight members when the decision was made because Justice Ruth
Bader Ginsburg had not yet been confirmed by the U.S. Senate to replace retiring Justice Byron
White. See Robert Green, Supreme Court Denies Stay in Adoption Case, REUTERS, July 30,
1993.
43. DeBoer v. DeBoer, 114 S. Ct. 1, 11 (1993). The majority denied the stay without com-
ment. Justice Blackmun filed a separate dissenting opinion, joined by Justice O'Connor, in
which he criticized the majority for ignoring the child's.best interests. "I am not willing to wash
my hands of this case at this stage, with the personal vulnerability of the child so much at risk."
Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
44. The emotional custody dispute ended with the "haunting videotape of the 2-year-old
child, weeping as she was carted away" from the DeBoers' home in Ann Arbor. Roberta de
[Vol. 70:1851
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II. BABY RICHARD
In many respects, the circumstances of the Baby Richard case
parallel those of the Baby Jessica case. Otakar Kirchner and Daniela
Janikova, the biological parents, were unmarried but living together in
Chicago when Daniela became pregnant in June 1990.45 The couple
learned that the baby was due in March 1991 and planned that the
baby would be born at St. Joseph's Hospital, located one block away
from their apartment.46 In late January 1991, Otakar returned to his
native Czechoslovakia for approximately two weeks to attend to his
gravely ill grandmother.47 While he was gone, Daniela received a tel-
ephone call from Otakar's aunt, who said that Otakar had been seeing
his former girlfriend in Czechoslovakia and the couple had married.
48
Shortly thereafter, Daniela moved out of the apartment and into a
shelter for abused women.49 During her stay at the shelter, Daniela
decided to place her baby for adoption.50 In mid-February 1991,
Daniela left the shelter and moved in with her uncle in a Chicago
suburb.51 When Otakar returned from Czechoslovakia in mid-Febru-
ary 1991, he tried to contact Daniela at her uncle's home, but she re-
fused to speak to him.
52
On March 16, 1991, Daniela went to Alexian Brothers Hospital in
Elk Grove Village, Illinois, and gave birth to Richard. 53 Four days
later, Daniela signed a document that gave her "final and irrevocable"
consent to the adoption.54 She told the adoptive parents55 and their
Boer, From Start, Media Took Sides in Baby Jessica Case, STAR TRIBUNE, Aug. 23, 1993, at 1lA.
The author of that story is not related to Roberta or Jan DeBoer. Id.
45. Doe 1, 627 N.E.2d 648, 649 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993), rev'd, 638 N.E.2d 181 (Ill.), cert. denied,
115 S. Ct. 499, and cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 499 (1994).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. Daniela subsequently called Otakar in Czechoslovakia, and he denied that his
aunt's story was true. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. After a friend contacted a lawyer for her, Daniela met with the lawyer and the
adoptive parents on several occasions. Daniela stated that she knew the biological father but
refused to disclose his identity because she feared he would assert his parental rights. Id. at 650.
51. Id. at 650.
52. Id. Daniela met with Otakar on two consecutive days at the end of February 1991, but
she refused to return his numerous calls thereafter. Id.
53. Id. On the same day, Otakar inquired at St. Joseph's Hospital about Daniela, but was
informed that she had not been admitted to the hospital. Otakar checked with St. Joseph's
Hospital on several other occasions, but each time was told that the hospital had no record of a
Daniela Janikova. Id.
54. Id. Under Illinois law, a natural parent's consent to adoption, if properly executed, is




attorney that she knew the father but would not furnish his name.56
On the same day, Richard was placed with the adoptive parents after
they filed an adoption petition that averred that the identity of the
biological father was unknown.5 7
Otakar made several inquiries about the baby, but Daniela and
her uncle repeatedly told him that the baby had died shortly after
birth.5 8 Fifty-seven days after the child was born, Otakar learned that
the child was alive and had been adopted.59 On May 18, 1991, Otakar
met with a lawyer to discuss the matter and intervened in the adoption
proceedings in June 1991.60 After reconciling, Otakar and Daniela
were married on September 12, 1991, and Otakar filed a petition to
declare paternity later that month.61 On December 23, 1991, the
adoptive parents filed an amended petition to adopt, alleging that be-
cause Otakar was an "unfit" parent under Illinois law, his consent to
the adoption was not necessary.62 At this point, Richard was already
nine months old.
The adoption trial began on May 5, 1992, and eight days later the
trial court entered judgment in favor of the adoptive parents.63 Over
fifteen months later, in a 2-1 opinion issued on August 18, 1993, the
Illinois Appellate Court affirmed the trial judge's decision and upheld
the adoption.64 Richard was nearly two and a half years old. The ap-
55. Court records referred to the adoptive parents, Kim and Robert Warburton, as John
and Jane Doe in order to protect Richard's anonymity. See Richard Jerome & Bryan Alexander,
The Homecoming, PEOPLE, May 29, 1995, at 40.
56. In re Doe, 638 N.E.2d 181, 182 (Ill.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 499, and cert. denied, 115 S.
Ct. 499 (1994) [hereinafter Doe I1]
57. Doe 1, 627 N.E.2d at 650. Otakar was not informed that the baby was being placed for
adoption. Id.
58. Id.
59. Doe II, 638 N.E.2d at 182.
60. Doe 1, 627 N.E.2d at 651. Otakar filed an Appearance in the adoption proceeding and
sought leave of court to file an answer. The trial court, however, struck Otakar's answer on the
ground that he lacked standing. Id.
61. Id. The paternity action proceeded to trial and resulted in a December 1991 finding that
Otakar was the biological father of Richard. Id.
62. Id. The adoptive parents alleged that Otakar was unfit because he failed "to demon-
strate a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the welfare of a new born
child during the first 30 days after its birth." 750 ILCS § 50/1D(l) (West 1995). When such a
showing is made by clear and convincing evidence, the unfit parent waives consent to the adop-
tion. Id. § 50/8(a)(1).
63. Doe 1, 627 N.E.2d at 651. Although Circuit Judge Eugene Wachowski's opinion is un-
published, the appellate court quoted his conclusion that Otakar was an unfit parent: "[T]here is
clear and convincing evidence that there was no reasonable degree of interest indicated by Mr.
Kirchner in the first thirty days of the life of this child." Id.
64. Id. at 656. Justice 'Iblly's vigorous dissent criticized the majority opinion, which "pa-
tently distorted and slanted the actual facts of this case on a number of important points." Id.
(Tully, P.J., dissenting). Justice Tully also argued that it was improper to terminate Otakar's
parental rights based on a failure to show interest in his child during the first thirty days of life
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pellate court emphasized that because the child was the real party in
interest, the child's best interests and corollary rights prevailed over
the interests and rights of both biological and adoptive parents. 65
Since Richard had spent all but four days of his life with his adoptive
parents, the court decided that it would be contrary to Richard's best
interests to remove him from their home.66
Nonetheless, on June 16, 1994, the Illinois Supreme Court re-
versed the appellate court's decision67 for two primary reasons. First,
the court noted that the appellate court's finding that Otakar was an
unfit parent because he "had not shown a reasonable degree of inter-
est in the child" was unsupported by the evidence. 68 Since Otakar was
not an unfit parent, his consent to the adoption was required.69 Sec-
ond, the court stressed that absent a finding of parental unfitness,
Richard's best interests could not be considered.70 Rather, the court
stressed that if a best interests inquiry, standing alone, were "a suffi-
cient qualification to determine child custody, anyone with superior
income, intelligence, education, etc., might challenge and deprive the
parents of their right to their own children. The law is otherwise and
was not complied with in this case. ' 71 The Illinois Supreme Court is-
sued its decision exactly three years and three months after Richard
was born. After the court denied rehearing, the adoptive parents ap-
because he was deceived by Daniela and was completely unaware of the child's birth until after
that time period had lapsed. Id. at 663 (Tully, P.J., dissenting).
65. Id. at 652.
66. Id. at 653. The court "extrapolated" from state and federal laws that "after a newborn
child has been placed for adoption and lives continuously thereafter for longer than 18 months
with his adopting parents... it would be contrary to the best interest of the child to remove him
from his home and family by disturbing the judgment of adoption." Id. At this stage of the
proceedings, Richard had spent all twenty-nine months of his life with his adoptive parents.
67. Doe I, 638 N.E.2d at 183.
68. Id. at 182. In fact, the court explained that Otakar had made "various attempts to lo-
cate the child, all of which were either frustrated or blocked by the actions of the mother." Id.
The court also noted that Daniela's efforts to conceal the birth were aided by the adoptive par-
ents' attorney, who made no effort to locate the name or address of the father, even though
Daniela indicated that she knew who he was. Id.
69. See 750 ILCS § 50/8(a) (West 1995) (amended 1995)
70. Doe II, 638 N.E.2d at 182.
71. Id. at 183. The court's refusal to apply the best interests test was later criticized as a
"bright line solution" by the New Mexico Supreme Court in In re Adoption of JJ.B., 894 P.2d
994, 1007 (N.M.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 168 (1995). That court concluded that a trial court
"should not be bound by the traditional bright line solution of awarding the child like a trophy to
whichever party wins the litigation. The child's best interests may be served by applying more
equitable principles." Id. at 1010.
1995]
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pealed to the United States Supreme Court, which denied their peti-
tions for certiorari on November 7, 1994.72
But, the legal battle over Baby Richard was still far from over.
The Illinois General Assembly responded to the Illinois Supreme
Court's June 1994 decision by rapidly amending Illinois's Adoption
Act; the amendments took effect on July 3, 1994. One of the new
provisions requires a court to conduct a custody hearing based on the
child's best interests when an adoption petition is denied or when an
adoption judgment is vacated.73 On January 25, 1995, the Illinois
Supreme Court heard oral arguments on Otakar's petition for a writ
of habeas corpus, issued an oral mandate to the adoptive parents to
surrender Baby Richard "forthwith" and did not grant them a best
interests hearing pursuant to the statute.74 The adoptive parents again
appealed to the United States Supreme Court, which twice declined to
stay the order of the Illinois Supreme Court.75 On February 28, 1995,
the Illinois Supreme Court issued its written opinion granting
Otakar's habeas corpus petition.76 The court concluded that the
adoptive parents lacked standing to request a custody hearing under
the statute and the best interests amendment could not be applied
retroactively to Baby Richard because final adjudication of the case
occurred when the court issued its previous opinion on June 16,
1994.
77
72. Separate petitions were filed by the adoptive parents and by Richard's guardian ad li-
tern, but both were denied. See Doe v. Kirchner, 115 S. Ct. 499 (1994); Baby Richard v. Kirch-
ner, 115 S. Ct. 499 (1994).
73. 750 ILCS § 50/20 (West 1995) (amended 1995).
74. See Edward Walsh, Justices Refuse to Delay Transfer of 'Baby Richard', W.sH. Posr,
Feb. 14, 1995, at A3.
75. O'Connell v. Kirchner, 115 S. Ct. 1084 (1995). The first request for a stay was denied by
Justice Stevens in his capacity as Circuit Justice for the Seventh Circuit. See O'Connell v. Kirch-
ner, 115 S. Ct. 891 (Stevens, Circuit Justice 1995). In so doing, Justice Stevens noted that "the
regrettable facts that an Illinois court entered an erroneous adoption decree in 1992 and that the
delay in correcting that error has had such unfortunate effects on innocent parties" were not
matters that he could consider in making his decision. Id. at 893. The second request for a stay
was denied by the full court, in a 7-2 decision, on February 13, 1995. See O'Connell v. Kirchner,
115 S. Ct. 1084 (1995). Joined by Justice Breyer, Justice O'Connor dissented, stressing that the
case involved "wrenching factual circumstances" and a stay was justified because the rationale
for the Illinois Supreme Court's order was unknown. Id. at 1084-85 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
76. In re Kirchner, 649 N.E.2d 324 (Ill.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2599, and cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 2600 (1995).
77. Id. at 338. "The legislative branch of Illinois' three-branch government cannot sit as a
reviewing court over the decisions of the judicial branch which has adjudicated a suit at law and
established and articulated the legal rights of the parties to the litigation." ld The court also
rejected the argument that Richard had a due process right to remain with the adoptive parents,
emphasizing instead that a right to family relationships does not supersede the natural parents'
interests absent a finding of unfitness. Id. at 339. The 5-2 opinion contained two separate dis-
sents. Justice Miller contended that the adoptive parents were entitled to a trial court hearing to
determine whether a best interests custody hearing would be proper under the statute. Id. at 343
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Sixteen days after the Illinois Supreme Court's written opinion
was handed down, Richard celebrated his fourth birthday. After deli-
cate negotiations regarding his transfer broke down, Richard was
taken from the adoptive parents and on April 30, 1995, before a
throng of media and protestors, was "returned" to Daniela and his
father, Otakar, whom Richard had never met. The legal proceedings
finally ended eight weeks later, when the United States Supreme




Linda Benco and Gary Bjorklund, the natural parents of Baby
Emily, were unmarried but living together when Linda became preg-
nant in November 1991.79 One month later, when Linda told Gary
she was pregnant, she claimed he had very little reaction to the
news.80 In addition, Linda maintained that she received neither finan-
cial nor emotional support from Gary throughout the entire preg-
nancy.81 In June 1992, she moved out of their apartment because
Gary was allegedly abusive.82 At some point prior to this time, how-
ever, Linda claimed she told Gary that she was considering adoption
and he responded by saying "do whatever you have to do."'83
Because Linda took this response to be a verbal agreement, she
continued to follow through with the adoption process and met with
Charlotte Danciu, an attorney.84 In July 1992, Danciu contacted
Gary, who told her he would not consent to the adoption.85 On Au-
gust 12, 1992, the trial court held a hearing on the adoptive parents'
(Miller, J., dissenting). Justice McMorrow sharply criticized the majority's characterization of
the facts and argued that its legal conclusions were "[i]n defiance of established Illinois law and
the constitutional rights of a small child under this law." Id. at 364 (McMorrow, J., dissenting).
78. The adoptive parents and Richard's guardian ad litem petitioned the Court to review
the Illinois Supreme Court's February 1995 decision that held that the adoptive parents were not
entitled to a custody hearing and that Otakar was entitled to custody of Richard. The Court,
however, denied certiorari in both cases. See Doe v. Kirchner, 115 S. Ct. 2599 (1995) (mem.);
Baby Richard v. Kirchner, 115 S. Ct. 2600 (1995) (mem.).
79. In re Adoption of Baby E.A.W., 647 So. 2d 918, 920 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (en
banc), affd, 658 So. 2d 961 (Fla. 1995).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 920-21.
82. See Cruel Adoption Laws Turn Babies Into Pawns, PALM BEACH POST, Dec. 5, 1994, at
12A. Linda moved in with a girlfriend who later testified that after Linda moved in with her,
Gary did not provide either financial or emotional support. See Baby E.A.W., 647 So. 2d at 921.
83. Baby E.A.W., 647 So. 2d at 921.
84. Id. Danciu acted as the intermediary in the adoption proceedings. Id. at 921.
85. Id. at 931 (Pariente, J., specially concurring).
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motion to waive Gary's consent to adoption. 86 On the same day, the
trial court signed an order that waived Gary's consent because he had
"deliberately avoided receiving notice" of the hearing and because he
had abandoned Linda.87 On August 28, 1992, Linda gave birth to Em-
ily, and the adoptive parents, Stephen and Angel Welsh, brought Em-
ily home three days later.88 Gary then went to Legal Aid to contest
the adoption.8
9
The trial judge conducted a hearing in October 1992, regarding
Gary's alleged abandonment. 90 After considering Gary's objection to
the adoption and his testimony,91 the court ruled on October 16, 1992,
that there was not "clear and convincing" evidence of abandonment.
92
Consequently, Gary's consent to the adoption was required before the
adoption could be finalized. 93 The trial judge, however, agreed to re-
hear the case, and after more evidentiary hearings, reversed his deci-
sion in September 1993 and finalized Emily's adoption to the
Welshes. 94 The trial judge's final decision was issued thirteen months
86. Id. at 930 (Pariente, J., specially concurring). Danciu did not inform the trial court of
her telephone conversation with Gary in which he objected and refused to consent to the adop-
tion. Id. at 931 (Pariente, J., specially concurring). Danciu also did not inform the adoptive
parents of his objection until Emily had been born. Judge Pariente concluded: "In short, we
cannot help but think that candor from this intermediary/attorney to the court and her clients,
the adoptive parents, might have prevented the series of events which occurred later." Id.
(Pariente, J., specially concurring).
87. Id. at 930 (Pariente, J., specially concurring).
88. ld. at 934 (Pariente, J., specially concurring); see also Elsa C. Arnett, 'Baby Emily' Case
a Groundbreaker, PMLADELPHIA INQUIRER, Sept. 1, 1994, at G4.
89. Baby E.A.W., 647 So. 2d at 922.
90. Id. at 921. Under the Florida Adoption Act, "abandoned" means
a situation in which the parent or legal custodian of a child, while being able, makes no
provision for the child's support and makes no effort to communicate with the child,
which situation is sufficient to evince a willful rejection of parental obligations. If, in
the opinion of the court, the efforts of such parent or legal custodian to support and
communicate with the child are only marginal efforts that do not evince a settled pur-
pose to assume all parental duties, the court may declare the child to be abandoned. In
making this decision, the court may consider the conduct of a father towards the child's
mother during her pregnancy.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.032(14) (West 1995) (emphasis added).
91. Gary testified that he did provide financial and emotional support to Linda during the
pregnancy and was "overjoyed" with the fact he was going to be a father. He also testified that,
when Danciu contacted him in July 1992, he told her that he would emphatically contest any
adoption proceeding, and he began his quest for legal representation at that time. Baby E.A. W.,
647 So. 2d at 921.
92. Id. at 934 (Klein, J., dissenting). Circuit Judge Gary Vonhoff's opinion is unreported,
but Judge Klein's dissent in the appellate court's en banc decision quoted his initial finding on
abandonment: "[U]nder any definition of abandonment, the natural father has not, in fact,
abandoned the natural mother or the child. He has exhibited every available means of attempt-
ing to contest the adoption." Id. (Klein, J., dissenting).
93. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.062(1)(b)(3) (West 1995) (amended 1995).
94. See Larry Barszewski, Dad Closer to Blocking Adoption, SUN-SENTINEL (Fort Lauder-
dale), June 23, 1994, at 1A. In this decision, the trial judge concluded that abandonment had
occurred because Gary "offered minimal financial support to the natural mother and ... the
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after the case first came before him and thirteen months after Emily
was born.
In a 2-1 opinion issued on June 22, 1994, Florida's District Court
of Appeal reversed the trial judge's decision and ruled in favor of
Gary. 95 At this point, Emily was rapidly approaching her second
birthday. Like the trial judge, the appellate court also agreed to re-
hear the case, and in a 6-5 decision en banc, reversed and upheld the
adoption on November 30, 1994.96 The court concluded that the trial
judge's finding of abandonment was supported by evidence in the rec-
ord and Gary had "made only legal, after-the-fact gestures toward
parenthood. '97 The court further emphasized that "the trial court's
finding of abandonment and our affirmance of that finding is based
upon the entire spectrum of 'conduct' and is certainly neither limited
to nor dependent upon the failure of the birth father to provide emo-
tional support to the expectant mother. ' 98 After the appellate court's
en banc decision, the first level of appeal in the Baby Emily case was
finally over. By this time, Emily was already twenty-seven months
old.
On July 20, 1995, just over one month before Emily's third birth-
day, the Florida Supreme Court ruled 5-2 to affirm the appellate
court's en banc decision. 99 The court concluded that trial courts may
consider a father's emotional abuse and lack of emotional support to-
ward the mother during her pregnancy when evaluating whether
emotional support to the natural mother was nonexistent. More importantly, there was almost
no testimony to establish that the natural father exhibited any type of feeling for the unborn
child." Baby E.A.W., 647 So. 2d at 922 (quoting the trial judge's opinion).
95. Baby E.A.W., 647 So. 2d at 941 app. The court began by noting that although the case
initially involved the single issue of whether or not Gary had waived consent to the adoption, "it
has since become needlessly complicated with multiple irrelevant issues and thereby unreasona-
bly delayed, all to the detriment of the child." Id. The court then proceeded to reject each of the
trial judge's three bases for reversing his earlier decision. First, the court found that Gary's
financial inability to support Linda during her pregnancy did not suffice to support abandonment
because it unfairly penalized Gary for being poor. Id. at 948-49 app. Second, the court held that
Gary's lack of emotional support was "entirely too vague a standard" to support a finding of
abandonment. Id. at 949 app. Finally, the court noted that Gary's assistance from Legal Aid in
asserting his parental rights could not justify terminating his parental rights because every person
has a right to counsel in such situations. Id. at 950-51 app.
96. Id. at 919. The appellate court's 2-1 decision in June 1994 was withdrawn and replaced
by the en banc opinion. ld. The court attached the 2-1 decision as an appendix to its en banc
opinion, however. Id. at 941-57 app.
97. Id. at 924. The court noted that because Gary was not married, he was not legally
responsible to support his child. The court therefore required Gary to take "some positive ac-
tion to assume the responsibilities of parenthood before he becomes entitled to exercise the
rights of parenthood," but concluded that he had failed to meet this burden. Id. at 923.
98. Id. at 924.
99. In re Adoption of Baby E.A.W., 658 So. 2d 961 (Fla. 1995).
1995]
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
abandonment has occurred.'00 Furthermore, the court found "sub-
stantial competent evidence to support the trial judge's finding of
clear and convincing evidence" that Gary abandoned Baby Emily.' 0'
A petition for certiorari was filed with the United States Supreme
Court on October 13, 1995.
IV. RIGHTS OF THE PUTATIVE FATHER
In each of the three principal cases, the putative father challenged
an adoption after his child had already been placed with the adoptive
parents. But a putative father should be required to affirmatively as-
sert an interest in his child before birth, ideally by submitting his name
to a putative father registry. As discussed more thoroughly in Part VI,
a putative father registry places only a slight burden on a putative
father and protects his rights from concealed adoptions similar to
those in the Baby Jessica and Baby Richard cases. A putative father
simply does not have an absolute right to raise his child merely be-
cause of his biological ties to the child. In fact, only recently have
courts recognized the rights of putative fathers.
For many years, the law was clear that a putative father had no
claim of custody to his child. 02 In 1972, however, the United States
Supreme Court in Stanley v. Illinois0 3 held unconstitutional an Illinois
statute that presumed every putative father was an unfit parent. 0 4
The putative father in Stanley had lived intermittently with his chil-
dren and the natural mother for eighteen years, and no evidence indi-
cated that he was a neglectful father. 0 5 In light of these
100. Id. at 964.
101. Id. at 967. Justice Kogan dissented in the result, arguing both that Gary had taken
sufficient steps to protect his opportunity interest in Emily's future and that the evidence sup-
porting prenatal abandonment was "at best equivocal and therefore uncompelling." Id. at 977
(Kogan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Anstead's dissent criticized the
majority of overreaching in several respects, primarily "in applying the concept of abandonment
to prebirth situations when the concept has traditionally, and with good reason, been limited to
relationships between parents and their actual existing children." Id. at 980 (Anstead, J.,
dissenting).
102. See MARTHA A. FIELD, SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD 121 (1988).
103. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
104. Illinois's dependency statute provided that children automatically became wards of the
state when one parent died, unless there was a surviving parent or guardian. Id. at 649. Illinois,
however, defined a "parent" as "the father and mother of a legitimate child, or the natural
mother of an illegitimate child ... and ... any adoptive parent." Id. at 650 (quoting ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 37, para. 701-14 (1967)). An unwed father was not included in the definition. There-
fore, under this statutory framework, no showing of unfitness was required before a child could
be removed from the father's custody to become a ward of the state; every putative father was
presumed to be unfit. Id. at 647.
105. Id. at 646, 655.
[Vol. 70:1851
LEGISLATIVE REFORM OF ADOPTION LAWS
considerations, the Court stressed that "[t]he private interest here,
that of a man in the children he has sired and raised, undeniably war-
rants deference and, absent a powerful countervailing interest, protec-
tion."'1 06 The Court therefore prohibited Illinois from removing the
children from the putative father's custody without first conducting a
parental "fitness" hearing.
10 7
A majority of the Supreme Court has addressed the scope of a
putative father's constitutional rights on three occasions since Stan-
ley.'0 8 Quilloin v. Walcott, the first of these cases, involved the consti-
tutionality of Georgia's adoption laws which, as applied, denied the
putative father authority to prevent adoption of his child.1°9 Under
Georgia's statute, only the consent of an unwed mother to an adop-
tion was required; an unwed father could acquire veto power over the
adoption only if he had legitimated his child." 0 The natural mother's
husband, who was the child's stepfather, filed a petition to adopt when
the child was eleven years old."' Although the putative father had
theretofore made no effort to legitimate his child, he filed a petition to
legitimate after the stepfather filed the adoption petition." 2 After the
trial court concluded that granting the legitimation petition would not
be in the "best interests of the child," the Supreme Court affirmed on
the grounds that application of the best interests standard adequately
106. Id. at 651. Although the Court acknowledged that the state had a legitimate interest in
protecting children in certain circumstances, it noted that this interest would be de minimis when
the father was a fit parent. Id. at 657-58.
107. 1d. at 658. The Court rejected Illinois's statutory presumption as violating the father's
procedural due process rights: "Procedure by presumption is always cheaper and easier than
individualized determination. But when, as here, the procedure forecloses the determinative
issues of competence and care ... it needlessly risks running roughshod over the important
interests of both parent and child. It therefore cannot stand." Id. at 656-57 (footnote omitted).
The Court also concluded that the Equal Protection Clause prohibited Illinois from granting
married parents, divorced parents, and unwed mothers a fitness hearing before children were
removed from their custody without also granting unwed fathers such a hearing. Id. at 658.
108. See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979);
Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978). In another case, a plurality of the Court upheld a
California statute that presumed that a married man was the father of his wife's child and denied
a putative father the right to establish paternity in an evidentiary hearing, even though blood
tests showed that there was a 98.07% chance the putative father was the biological father.
Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (plurality opinion).
109. 434 U.S. 246.
110. Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 248-49. In contrast, Georgia required both living parents to con-
sent when the child was born to married parents, even if the parents were divorced or separated
at the time of the adoption proceedings. Id. at 248.
111. Id. at 249. By this time, the mother and stepfather had already been married for eight
years, and the child had been in the custody of his natural mother since birth. Id. at 247.
112. Id. at 247. The putative father did not seek custody of the child; he filed the legitimation
petition only to secure visitation rights. Id.
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protected the father's interests. 113 The Court also suggested that mere
biological ties are insufficient when the father "has never exercised
actual or legal custody over his child, and thus has never shouldered
any significant responsibility with respect to the daily supervision, ed-
ucation, protection or care of the child.""
14
The Court revisited a putative father's rights one year later in
Caban v. Mohammed.115 In that case, a New York statute permitted
an unwed mother to prevent an adoption by withholding her consent,
but did not give unwed fathers similar power, even when the father
had already developed a substantial relationship with his children. 116
Although the putative father had developed a "substantial" relation-
ship with his son and daughter, 1 7 his rights were terminated under the
statute when the natural mother and her husband adopted the chil-
dren. 1 8 The Court acknowledged that because the statute imposed a
gender-based distinction, it could survive constitutional challenge
under the Equal Protection Clause only if it was substantially related
to the achievement of important governmental objectives." 9 The
Court concluded that the State's proffered reasons for the gender-
based distinction did not meet this standard. First, it rejected the
State's claim that a "fundamental difference between maternal and
paternal relations" justified the distinction. 20 Second, the Court re-
jected the State's argument that promoting adoption of illegitimate
113. The Court analyzed this standard in the context of both due process and equal protec-
tion. As to due process, the Court stated that due process would not be offended by use of a
"best interests" standard where "the result of the adoption in this case is to give full recognition
to a family unit already in existence, a result desired by all concerned, except [the putative fa-
ther]." Id. at 255. As to the equal protection claim, the Court concluded that a state may give an
unwed father less authority to veto an adoption than a divorced or separated father. The unwed
father's interests, the Court noted, are "readily distinguishable" from those of a separated or
divorced father who "will have borne full responsibility for the rearing of his children during the
period of the marriage." Id. at 256.
114. Id. at 256.
115. 441 U.S. 380, 385-87 (1979).
116. The natural father could prevent termination of his parental rights only by showing that
the adoption would not be in the best interests of the child. Id. at 387.
117. Id. at 387. In support of this conclusion, the Court noted that Caban "lived with the
children as their father" and "contributed to the support of the family" for more than four years.
Id. at 382. He continued to visit and communicate with the children after the natural mother
took them and moved in with her future husband. Id. at 382-83.
118. Id. at 383-84.
119. Id. at 388.
120. Id. at 388-89. The Court stated that such a generalization, even if it were true in infancy,
would diminish in importance as the children got older:
The present case demonstrates that an unwed father may have a relationship with his
children fully comparable to that of the mother .... There is no reason to believe that
the Caban children-aged 4 and 6 at the time of the adoption proceedings-had a
relationship with their mother unrivaled by the affection and concern of their father.
Id. at 389.
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children was a valid reason for the distinction. 121 The Court did note,
however, that nothing in the Equal Protection Clause would preclude
the State from treating fathers who failed to participate in the rearing
of their children differently from fathers like Caban, who had mani-
fested significant paternal interest in his children.
122
The final case in the sequence, Lehr v. Robertson, also involved a
New York adoption statute. 23 In that case, the Court upheld a New
York law which did not require that notice of adoption proceedings be
given to a putative father who failed to register his name with the
state, even if the state had notice of his existence and whereabouts.
1 24
The natural mother and her husband filed a petition to adopt the
mother's two year-old child, and an adoption order was subsequently
issued. 25 The putative father discovered that the adoption had taken
place and brought suit to invalidate it on the grounds he was not given
advance notice of those proceedings. 26 The Court dismissed the pu-
tative father's due process claim by distinguishing actual from poten-
tial parent-child relationships:
When an unwed father demonstrates a full commitment to the re-
sponsibilities of parenthood by "com[ing] forward to participate in
the rearing of his child," Caban, 441 U.S. at 392, his interest in per-
sonal contact with his child acquires substantial protection under
the Due Process Clause .... But the mere existence of a biological
link does not merit equivalent constitutional protection.
27
Since the putative father had not participated in the rearing of his
child during the first two years of life, the father's due process rights
were not violated. 128 The Court also dismissed the father's equal pro-
121. Id. at 389. The Court rejected this claim because there was no reason to believe that
unwed fathers would be more likely than unwed mothers to withhold consent to adoptions. Id.
at 392.
122. Id. at 392.
123. 463 U.S. 248, 250-51 (1983).
124. Such a statutory requirement is known as a "putative father registry." The effectiveness
of these registries is discussed infra notes 207-221 and accompanying text.
125. Id. at 250.
126. Id. Although certain classes of putative fathers were entitled to automatic notice under
the statute without having to register, the Court noted that Lehr was not a member of any of
those classes. Id. at 251-52.
127. Id. at 261.
128. The Court noted that the putative father's name was not listed on the birth certificate,
he did not live with the mother or the child after birth, he did not offer to marry the mother, and
he had never provided them with any financial support. Id. at 252. The Court also noted that
the fact that the trial court and the mother knew of the father's whereabouts did not mandate a
contrary result: "The Constitution does not require either a trial judge or a litigant to give spe-
cial notice to nonparties who are presumptively capable of asserting and protecting their own
rights." Id. at 265 (footnote omitted).
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tection claim because he was not "similarly situated" to the natural
mother, who had established a relationship with the child.129
The principle derived from these four Supreme Court cases is
that biology alone does not provide a putative father with constitu-
tional rights. Instead, "it is the liberty interest the father of an illegiti-
mate child has in a developed parent-child relationship ... that has
been recognized as an interest that is clothed with constitutional safe-
guards of due process and equal protection.' 30 Indeed, the Supreme
Court has repeatedly endorsed the principle that a natural parent has
a fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody, and nurturing of
his or her child. 131 The Court has also held that a putative father is
entitled to some procedural protection. 132 Consequently, several
lower courts have invalidated adoptions where the biological father
did not have notice of the adoption proceedings. 133
That is not to say, however, that a putative father must receive
notice of or consent to the adoption in all cases. 134 Although a puta-
tive father is entitled to some constitutional protection, he generally
must take action quickly in order to protect his parental rights. 135 For
example, New York's highest court stressed in Robert 0. v. Russell
K136 that how quickly the father acts is the "most significant" element
129. Id. at 267 (footnote omitted). "If one parent has an established custodial relationship
with the child and the other parent has either abandoned or never established a relationship, the
Equal Protection Clause does not prevent a State from according the two parents different legal
rights." Id. at 267-68 (footnotes omitted).
130. H. JOSEPH GrrLN, ADOTMONS: AN ATTORNEY's GUIDE TO HELPING ADOPTIVE PAR-
ENTS 74 (1987).
131. See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982); Lassiter v. Department of Soc.
Servs., 452 U.S. 18,27 (1981). Other courts have recognized this principle as well. See, e.g., In re
L.W., 613 A.2d 350, 355 (D.C. 1992); Nale v. Robertson, 871 S.W.2d 674, 678 (Tenn. 1994) ("Par-
ents, including parents of children born out of wedlock, have a fundamental liberty interest in
the care and custody of their children ... ").
132. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 550 (1965) ("It is clear that failure to give
[the natural father] notice of the pending adoption proceedings violated the most rudimentary
demands of due process of law.").
133. See, e.g., In re M.N.M., 605 A.2d 921 (D.C.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 636 (1992); In re
B.G.S., 556 So. 2d 545 (La. 1990); In re S.R.S., 408 N.W.2d 272 (Neb. 1987) (per curiam).
134. For example, those states that have putative father registries do not require that notice
be given to unwed fathers who fail to register with the state either before or shortly after the
child's birth. See infra notes 208-214 and accompanying text.
135. See, e.g., In re Juvenile Severance Action No. S-114487, 876 P.2d 1121, 1132 (Ariz. 1994)
(en banc) (putative father must "act persistently" and must "vigorously assert his legal rights"
even when circumstances prevent him from exercising traditional methods of bonding with the
child); In re Steve B.D., 730 P.2d 942, 945 (Idaho 1986) (per curiam) ("because of a child's
urgent need for permanence and stability, the unwed father must act quickly to take responsibili-
ties and establish ties" with the child); In re Adoption of Clark, 381 S.E.2d 835, 840 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1989), rev'd, 393 S.E.2d 791 (N.C. 1990) (father's consent to adoption unnecessary where
he failed to legitimate his child before the adoption petition was filed).
136. 604 N.E.2d 99 (N.Y. 1992).
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in determining whether a putative father has created a liberty inter-
est.137 The court further emphasized that the timing of the father's
actions should be determined by the life of the baby, not when the
father learned that he was indeed the real father. 138 Finally, the court
maintained that a timing requirement based on the child's life rather
than the father's actions is "a logical and necessary outgrowth of the
State's legitimate interest in the child's need for early permanence and
stability."' 39
In the Baby Jessica case, it is debatable whether Daniel Schmidt
acted with sufficient promptness to protect his constitutional rights.
The Iowa Supreme Court found that Daniel did not abandon Jessica
under Iowa law.140 Rather, the court maintained that Daniel did
"everything he could reasonably do to assert his parental rights" after
Jessica was born.' 4' While Daniel may have acted promptly after
birth, the court ignored how Daniel acted prior to Jessica's birth. Jus-
tice Snell's dissenting opinion pointed out that because Daniel and
Cara worked in the same building for the same employer, Daniel
knew Cara was pregnant in December 1990, two months before Jes-
sica was born.142 Because Daniel took no responsible steps to legiti-
mate his child before birth, the dissent maintained that his parental
rights should have been terminated: "Daniel's sudden desire to as-
sume parental responsibilities is a late claim to assumed rights that he
forfeited by his indifferent conduct to the fate of Cara and her
child."143
A second concern in the Baby Jessica case is that Daniel had fa-
thered two other children, both of whom he failed to support. The
Iowa Supreme Court acknowledged that "Daniel has had a poor per-
formance record as a parent .... The record shows that Daniel has
137. Id. at 103; see also In re Raquel Marie X., 559 N.E.2d 418, 428 (N.Y.), cert. denied, 498
U.S. 984 (1990).
138. "Promptness is measured in terms of the baby's life not by the onset of the father's
awareness." Robert 0., 604 N.E.2d at 103. This standard is easily justified, particularly when
one considers that the child is completely innocent and should not be forced to shoulder the
burden of a protracted custody battle because the natural father took no interest in the child
before birth.
139. Id. at 103-04.
140. In re B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d 239, 246 (Iowa 1992). Under Iowa law, "[t]o abandon a minor
child" means to permanently relinquish or surrender "the parental rights, duties, or privileges
inherent in the parent-child relationship. The term includes both the intention to abandon and
the acts by which the intention is evidenced. The term does not require that the relinquishment
or surrender be over any particular period of time." IOWA CODE ANN. § 600A.2(16).
141. B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d at 246.
142. Id. at 247 (Snell, J., dissenting).
143. Id. (Snell, J., dissenting).
1995]
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
largely failed to support these children financially and has failed to
maintain meaningful contact with either of them."'144 Daniel's failure
to care for his other children seems to be an extremely relevant factor
but one that was given no substantial weight by any court. The courts
might not have addressed the issue because the Iowa statutory provi-
sion on abandonment does not specify that relationships with previous
children may be considered. Under the revised Uniform Adoption
Act, however, Daniel's relationships with his previous children and his
conduct during Cara's pregnancy could have been considered in deter-
mining whether his parental rights with regard to Jessica should have
been terminated. 145
In the Baby Emily case, two arguments can be made that support
the termination of Gary's parental rights. First, as the Florida District
Court of Appeals noted en banc, he showed no interest in the baby
during the pregnancy and was abusive toward the natural mother. 146
The appellate court's reliance on this conduct as grounds for abandon-
ment was justified, based on an earlier decision by the Florida
Supreme Court.147 Second, there was public outcry that Gary's paren-
tal rights should be ignored because he was convicted in 1977 of rap-
ing a woman at gunpoint. 148 Under the Uniform Adoption Act,
Gary's parental rights could be terminated on the basis of prebirth
abandonment 149 and, perhaps, on the basis of his rape conviction. 150
144. Id. at 245. Justice Snell expounded that Daniel's first child was born in 1976 but Daniel
stopped supporting him just two years later; from 1978 to 1990, Daniel saw his son three times.
Before Jessica was born, Daniel fathered one other daughter, "whom he has never seen and has
failed to support. He stated he just never took any interest in her." Id. at 247 (Snell, J.,
dissenting).
145. The Act enables a court to consider the natural father's "behavior during the mother's
pregnancy" and "the quality of any previous relationship ... between [the natural father] and
any other minor children" in deciding whether to terminate parental rights. UNIF. ADOPTON
Acr § 3-504(d)(3), (e) (1994).
146. In re Baby E.A.W., 647 So. 2d 918, 924 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (en banc), aff'd, 658
So. 2d 961 (Fla. 1995).
147. In re Adoption of Doe, 543 So. 2d 741, 746 (Fla.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 964 (1989)
("[P]rebirth conduct does tend to prove or disprove material facts bearing on abandonment and
may be properly introduced and used as a basis for finding abandonment .... "). The appellate
court also concluded that the totality of circumstances was stronger in the Baby Emily case than
in Doe to support a finding of abandonment. Baby E.A.W., 647 So. 2d at 924.
Other courts have also found prebirth abandonment sufficient to terminate a father's rights.
See, e.g., Doe v. Attorney W., 410 So. 2d 1312, 1317 (Miss. 1982) (upholding termination of
father's rights where he "allowed the natural mother to bear all the physical, mental and finan-
cial burdens of pregnancy and childbirth without at any time assisting her financially"); In re
Baby Girl K., 335 N.W.2d 846, 855 (Wis. 1983), appeal dismissed, 465 U.S. 1016 (1984) (father's
failure to provide "care or support" to mother during pregnancy, despite his ability to do so, is
evidence justifying termination of parental rights).
148. Gary served five years of a 10-year sentence for the crime. See Robert L. Steinback,
Courts Differ on Direction of Custody Cases, MiAMi HERALD, July 1, 1994, at lB.
149. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
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Of the three principal cases, the Baby Richard case presents the
strongest argument that it would be unfair to deprive the natural fa-
ther, Otakar Kirchner, of his parental rights. Daniela concealed Rich-
ard's birth and adoption, and her uncle lied to Otakar by stating that
the baby died shortly after birth.' 5 ' Otakar, however, did not believe
this explanation and immediately made efforts to locate his son:
As the trial court found, Otto searched the garbage cans of the
home where Daniella was living for physical evidence of his baby
and called a series of hospitals in an attempt to discover whether his
child had really died at birth, during the first 30 days after Richard
was born notwithstanding that he had been told his child was
dead.... [His conduct] showed an intense interest and concern for
both the truth and for his child. He did what he could.
152
When Otakar finally learned that Richard was alive, he met with a
lawyer and instituted proceedings to assert his rights a few weeks
later.153 "The unilateral decision by one individual to deprive a per-
son of the opportunity to know his child-without any showing of
fault on the part of the person so deprived-would not, it is submit-
ted, be accepted-or tolerated-in any other context."'1 54 Because
Otakar took several steps to locate his child, the Illinois Supreme
Court correctly found that his parental rights were improperly
terminated. 5
5
There is little dispute that the constitutional rights of the putative
father must be given due consideration in an adoption dispute. It is
often difficult, however, to assess whether the father has taken suffi-
cient steps to establish a protected liberty interest in raising his child.
A putative father registry, discussed in more detail in Part VI, is an
150. Parental rights may be terminated by clear and convincing evidence that shows that
"the respondent has been convicted of a crime of violence or of violating a restraining or protec-
tive order, and the facts of the crime or violation and the respondent's behavior indicate that the
respondent is unfit to maintain a relationship of parent and child with the minor." UNtF. ADOP-
TIoN Acr § 3-504(c)(3). It is unclear, however, whether a court interpreting this section would
conclude that a 1977 rape conviction would be sufficient grounds to terminate a father's rights to
a child born fifteen years later.
151. Doe I, 627 N.E.2d 648, 650 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993), rev'd, 638 N.E.2d 181 (Il1.), cert. denied,
115 S. Ct. 499, and cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 499 (1994).
152. In re Kirchner, 649 N.E.2d 324, 328 (Ill.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2599, and
cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2600 (1995).
153. Doe 1, 627 N.E.2d at 651.
154. John R. Hamilton, Note, The Unwed Father and the Right to Know of His Child's Exist-
ence, 76 Ky. L.J. 949, 1009 (1988). Putative father registries would prevent concealed adoptions
by placing the burden on the natural father to assert his rights before birth and should prevent
any procedural due process challenges after placement has already occurred. See infra notes
207-221 and accompanying text.
155. But see Kirchner, 649 N.E.2d at 343-46 (McMorrow, J., dissenting) (questioning the ma-
jority's characterization of the facts and Otakar's fitness as a parent).
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ideal solution. Such a registry eliminates the need for judges to make
subjective assessments of a father's behavior and enables a father
truly committed to raising his child to protect his own rights before the
child is given up for adoption.
V. THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD
Although the putative father's constitutional rights must be con-
sidered, the best interests of the child frequently support upholding
the adoption. Thus, a court is often faced with a difficult decision:
"[S]hould the court deny the adoption and risk causing emotional
harm to the child, or should it grant the adoption to safeguard the
child's best interests and thereby deprive the putative father of his
parental rights?"'156 There is little judicial precedent on which a court
may rely, because determining the child's best interests rests entirely
on the facts of each particular case. 57 In addition, current state laws
do not make judicial resolution of the conflict between the putative
father's rights and protecting the child's welfare any easier. Every
state stresses that the best interests of the child must be the para-
mount consideration in interpreting adoption statutes. 58 In fact, the
adoption statutes in the three principal cases all explicitly emphasize
this point. 59 The Illinois provision so persuaded the state's appellate
court that it decided the Baby Richard case exclusively on Richard's
best interests:
Since the child is the real party in interest, it is his best interest and
corollary rights that come before anything else, including the inter-
ests and rights of biological and adoptive parents .... If there is a
conflict between Richard's best interest and the rights and interests
of his parents, whomever they may be, the rights and interests of the
156. Daniel C. Zinman, Father Knows Best" The Unwed Father's Right to Raise His Infant
Surrendered for Adoption, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. 971, 987 (1992).
157. In re L.W., 613 A.2d 350, 355 (D.C. 1992) (court's analysis must be "fact-specific and
practical, not doctrinal"); In re Dependency of A.V.D., 815 P.2d 277, 283 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991)
(every case "must be decided on its own facts and circumstances").
158. Marija E. Selmann, Note, For the Sake of the Child: Moving Toward Uniformity in Adop-
tion Law, 69 WASH. L. REV. 841, 843 (1994).
159. Florida's adoption statute states that a court "shall enter such orders as it deems neces-
sary and suitable to promote and protect the best interests of the person to be adopted." FLA.
STAT. ch. 63.022(l) (1994). Similarly, the Illinois Adoption Act requires that "[t]he best interests
and welfare of the person to be adopted shall be of paramount consideration in the construction
and interpretation of this Act." 750 ILCS § 50/20a (West 1995) (amended 1995). When the
Baby Jessica case was decided, Iowa law mandated that "[t]he welfare of the person to be
adopted shall be the paramount consideration in interpreting this division. The interests of the
adopting parents, however, shall be given due consideration in this interpretation." IOWA CODE
ANN. § 600.1 (West 1981). The Iowa provision has since been amended. See infra notes 171-172
and accompanying text.
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parents must yield and allow the best interest of Richard to pass
through and prevail. This tenet allows for no exception.16°
The Illinois Supreme Court, however, later reversed this decision,
concluding that Illinois law requires statutory grounds for terminating
parental rights before the child's best interests may be considered.
161
In the Baby Jessica case, the Iowa Supreme Court reached a similar
conclusion. 162
Furthermore, several courts that have recently addressed this is-
sue have also held that the putative father's parental rights must be
terminated before the best interests of the child can be evaluated. For
example, in Nale v. Robertson, the Tennessee Supreme Court invali-
dated a state statutory provision that allowed a court to enter an
adoption decree based on the child's best interests without a prior ju-
dicial termination of the father's parental rights: "[T]he state and fed-
eral constitutions require that the natural father's parental rights be
determined before the court may proceed with the issue of adop-
tion."'1 63 In In re Stevens, the Delaware Supreme Court concluded
that "acceptance of a best interest of the child [sic] as the exclusive or
dominant ground for termination of parental rights raises a serious
due process and equal protection concern."' 64 Instead, the court held
that a statutory basis for termination of parental rights is required
before the best interests test can be applied.'
65
Not all states have such a requirement, however. "[T]he statutes
in some states provide that a parent's rights respecting his child may
be terminated when that is required in order to serve the child's best
interests."'1 66 In Massachusetts, for example, the consent of both natu-
ral parents to an adoption petition may be waived where the court
160. Doe 1, 627 N.E.2d 648, 652 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993), rev'd, 638 N.E.2d 181 (I11.), cert denied,
115 S. Ct. 499, and cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 499 (1994).
161. See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
162. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
163. 871 S.W.2d 674, 680 (Tenn. 1994).
164. 652 A.2d 18, 26 (Del. 1995) (en banc). The court further emphasized that applying the
best interests standard without a showing of unfitness "carries the dangerous potential of placing
the welfare of the child over the legitimate familial interests of parents who have sought to assert
their parental rights in good faith." Id. In another case addressing this issue, the New Jersey
Supreme Court stressed that it "has long been decided that the mere fact that a child would be
better off with one set of parents than with another is an insufficient basis for terminating the
natural parent's rights." In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1252 (N.J. 1988).
165. Stevens, 652 A.2d at 25.
166. HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMEsTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNrTED STATES,
§ 20.7, at 905 (2d ed. 1988). The United States Supreme Court has never decided whether paren-
tal rights can be terminated solely on the basis of the child's best interests. The Court's only
mention of the issue was a vague reference in Santosky v. Kramer "Nor is it clear that the State




finds that granting the petition is in the child's best interests. 167 In so
doing, however, a court must "consider the ability, capacity, fitness
and readiness of the child's parents or other person . . . to assume
parental responsibility and ... consider the ability, capacity, fitness
and readiness" of the prospective adoptive parents. 168 Thus, the issue
of whether the child's best interests may be considered when termi-
nating parental rights varies from state to state.
Both the Illinois and Iowa legislatures amended their best inter-
ests standards in response to the Baby Richard and Baby Jessica cases.
The Illinois legislature amended its Adoption Act in July 1994, one
month after the Illinois Supreme Court invalidated the adoption of
Baby Richard and granted custody to Otakar Kirchner. The amend-
ment requires a best interests hearing after an adoption is vacated, but
the Illinois Supreme Court, after the amendment was enacted, refused
to apply the amendment retroactively to the Baby Richard case.
While the General Assembly may enact retroactive legislation
which changes the effect of a prior decision of a reviewing court
with respect to others whose circumstances are similar but whose
rights have not been finally decided, it is axiomatic that the General
Assembly may not validly enact a statute, the effect of which is to
change a decision of this court which has finally adjudicated the
rights of particular parties. 169
After this decision, another bill designed to clean up the statutory lan-
guage of the Baby Richard amendment was approved by a committee
in the Illinois House. 170
In Iowa, the state legislature responded to the Baby Jessica case
by amending the best interests standard. 171 The new provision still
requires a court to give due consideration to the interests of the
adopting parents in determining what is in the best interests of the
child. But the amendment goes one step further:
[I]n determining the best interest of the person to be adopted and
the interests of the adopting parents, any evidence of interests relat-
ing to a period of time during which the person to be adopted is
167. See Adoption of a Minor, 389 N.E.2d 90, 90 (Mass. 1979).
168. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 210, § 3(c) (West 1987).
169. In re Kirchner, 649 N.E.2d 324, 336-37 (II1.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2599,
and cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2600 (1995). The adoptive parents argued that the new amendment
could be applied retroactively because the case was still "pending" in July 1994-petitions for
rehearing with the Illinois Supreme Court and petitions for certiorari with the United States
Supreme Court had not yet been denied. The Illinois Supreme Court, however, rejected this
argument on the ground that "final adjudication" of Otakar's right to custody took place in the
court's June 1994 decision. Id. at 337.
170. David Heckelman, House Panel Moves to lighten 'Baby Richard' Law, Cm. DAILY L.
BULL, May 10, 1995, at 1. Whether the bill will be enacted into law remains to be seen.
171. IOWA CODE § 600.1 (1995).
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placed with prospective adoptive parents and during which the
placement is not in compliance with the law, adoption procedures,
or any action by the court, shall not be considered in the
determination.17
2
This provision may dissuade potential adoptive parents both from ig-
noring court orders to return children to natural parents and from
prolonging the legal battles in order to further strengthen their psy-
chological bonds with the child.
Many people believe that the best interests of the child should be
the exclusive consideration in an adoption case. 173 In fact, a substan-
tial number of courts apply the best interests test, despite its inher-
ently subjective nature, as the paramount consideration in child
custody disputes. 74 On one hand, the best interests standard safe-
guards the child, who lacks the maturity and intelligence to under-
stand the emotional consequences of removal from psychological
parents:
When adults are forced to bear the consequences of their choices,
however disastrous, at least their character and personality have
been fully formed, and that character can provide the foundation
for recovery, the will to go on. The character and personality of a
child two and one-half years old is just beginning to take shape. To
visit the consequences of adult choices upon the child during the
formative years of her life . . . is unnecessarily harsh and without
legal justification. 175
On the other hand, the problem with using the best interests test as
the exclusive consideration is that it will invariably give preference to
parents based on their social and economic status. Despite a loving
relationship, some parents could lose their children to more affluent
or better-educated parents. "A transfer of parental rights in such set-
tings may well advance the best interest of a particular child but the
law does not sanction such a change without compliance with statu-
tory standards."' 76 In addition, the best interests standard has been
criticized repeatedly as being too vague. "Best interest is so amor-
172. Id.
173. One study showed that 95% of those surveyed preferred the best interests test as the
paramount consideration. This is What You Thought, GLAMOUR, Jan. 1994, at 77.
174. See, e.g., In re Custody of C.C.R.S., 892 P.2d 246, 257-58 (Colo.) (en banc), cert. denied,
116 S. Ct. 118 (1995) (mem.) ("[T]he best interests of the child standard is the prevailing deter-
mination in a custody contest between biological parents and psychological parents. Our fore-
most priority is therefore to resolve the dispute in a way that minimizes the detriment to the
child."); In re Dependency of J.B.S., 863 P.2d 1344 (Wash. 1993) (en banc). But see In re Adop-
tion of S.E.B., 891 P.2d 440, 445 (Kan. 1995) (although best interests test is paramount consider-
ation in custody matters, it does not govern the statutory issue of terminating parental rights).
175. Clausen II, 502 N.W.2d 649, 671 (Mich. 1993) (per curiam) (Levin, J., dissenting).
176. In re Stevens, 652 A.2d 18, 26 (Del. 1995).
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phous a concept that it should not be considered until and unless facts
are proven which raise serious questions about the existence or viabil-
ity of the parent-child relationship."'177 The ideal solution, therefore,
would be to protect the best interests of the child without having to
apply the standard. Enacting legislative reforms designed to expedite
the adoption process and imposing strict guidelines on natural and
adoptive parents should solve the problem.
In an adoption case, although the child's emotions and develop-
ment are in limbo, a child is often treated as property, lacking emotion
or feeling. 178 One writer said of Baby Jessica's return to the Schmidts:
"She'll be moved from Michigan to Iowa like a piece of furniture
awarded in a property dispute. Only furniture doesn't feel loss or con-
fusion."'1 79 Therefore, it is certainly in the best interests of the child
and all parties involved to have a "clear rule from the outset as to who
her proper custodian is, to prevent her from being transferred back
and forth between parties who are feuding over their parental
rights."'1 80 In order to protect the best interests of the child without
forcing a judge or psychologist to apply the actual test, states should
enact legislative reforms.
VI. NECESSARY LEGISLATIVE REFORMS
While the best interests of the child standard is laudable because
it makes the child's well-being the paramount concern, application of
the standard is not always easy, particularly when both the natural and
adoptive parents will provide a stable and loving home for the child.
Adoption cases become even more complicated when a judge must
also make a subjective assessment about whether or not the putative
father asserted his parental interest in a timely fashion. The question,
then, is how best to balance the rights and interests of all parties in-
volved while taking into account the child's well-being. The proposed
reforms discussed below accomplish this goal by preventing postplace-
177. Lucy Cooper & Patricia Nelson, Adoption and Termination Proceedings in Wisconsin: A
Reply Proposing Limiting Judicial Discretion, 66 MARo. L. REV. 641, 643 (1983); see also
Selmann, supra note 158, at 843 ("The best interests standard is nebulous and largely
undefined.").
178. See, e.g., Clausen II, 502 N.W.2d at 687 (Levin, J., dissenting) ("The majority, by ignor-
ing the best interests of the child, has approached this case as if it were a contest between two
parties over a piece of property."); Lynne Trinklein, Heart-Wrenching Adoption Drama May
Result in Better Laws, IDAHO FALLS POST REG., Aug. 6, 1993, at A5 (Jessica DeBoer "was
treated like property. A grand prize, winner-take-all trophy.").
179. Ellen Goodman, Finding Justice for Jessica - or Anna, NEWSDAY, July 29, 1993, at 109.
180. FiELD, supra note 102, at 89.
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ment challenges and by fostering finality and rapid placement in order
to protect the child's fragile emotional state.
First, expedited court decisions and appeals will ensure that the
final placement of a child takes place quickly. Second, a putative fa-
ther registry will allow the putative father to protect his parental rights
before the child is placed with adoptive parents, even if the natural
mother seeks to conceal the adoption. Third, mandatory preplace-
ment counseling will ensure that the natural mother is giving her in-
formed consent when she places her child for adoption. Fourth,
punishing fraud will discourage the natural mother from fraudulently
concealing the natural father's identity. By incorporating these re-
forms, states can ensure that the best interests of the child will be pro-
moted without forcing judges to apply an amorphous, subjective
standard on a case-by-case basis.
A. Expedited Decisions and Appeals
The three principal cases poignantly illustrate the need for more
rapid decisions and appeals in adoption cases. Presently, private
adoption disputes are not being resolved quickly enough. 181 The Illi-
nois Appellate Court in the Baby Richard case underscored this prob-
lem: "Richard's story is the account of a helpless child caught in the
quagmire of a judicial system that in attempting to resolve his problem
became part of his problem. ... In a case of this nature, where plainly
time is critical, it is a sad commentary on our judiciary."'1 82 Courts
181. See, e.g., Kirsten Korn, Comment, The Struggle for the Child: Preserving the Family in
Adoption Disputes between Biological Parents and Third Parties, 72 N.C. L. REV. 1279, 1327
(1994). In addition to the three principal cases, other courts have recently stressed that adoption
cases take far too long to resolve. See, e.g., Stevens, 652 A.2d at 30 ("Children should not be
placed in a legal limbo for long periods of time while adults litigate their claims of relationship.
All the adult parties to this proceeding bear some blame for their acrimonious and often mis-
leading efforts to delay and frustrate the legal process."); In re BJB, 888 P.2d 216, 220 (Wyo.
1995) ("We are committed to the earliest possible resolution of this case; neither the parties nor
the child should be suspended in the judicial equivalent of outer space any longer.").
182. Doe 1, 627 N.E.2d 648, 656 (Il1. App. Ct. 1993), rev'd, 638 N.E.2d 181 (Ill.), cert. denied,
115 S. Ct. 499, and cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 499 (1994). The court placed some of the blame on the
attorneys for failing to advise the court of the exigent nature of the case and for not moving to
have the case expedited. Id. at 656 n.5. Other courts have also blamed attorneys who fail to
request expedition. See, e.g., In re J.M.P., 528 So. 2d 1002, 1017 (La. 1988). In the Baby Emily
case, one justice criticized the entire system for its failure to protect the child:
In a real sense, the most victimized party here is the child. Where does the fault lie?-
It rests on inadequate laws, procedural rules incapable of recognizing the needs of a
small growing child, state agencies too unmindful of the biological father's rights, par-
ties too eager to litigate, judges and lawyers who let the child's fate bog down in a
quagmire of legal technicality. We all have failed Baby Emily.
In re Adoption of Baby E.A.W., 658 So. 2d 961, 979 (Fla. 1995) (Kogan, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
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have recognized the importance of prompt decisions in light of the
potential psychological effects on a child:
The damage done by the actual and potential disruption of the
adoption system by protracted litigation of such cases would be es-
pecially incalculable as to the children involved. The harm caused
to infants, who need stable relationships with adults for the psycho-
logical bonding necessary for their well-being and character devel-
opment, could be incurable.'
83
Experts in psychology also agree that because rapid placement is criti-
cal to a child's development, all parties involved must greatly reduce
the time they take for decision making.
84
Expediency is critical at all stages of an adoption case. Initial
court hearings must be conducted promptly, and the appeal period
"should be extremely short, not more than a week or two with a final
decision rendered within days after the close of that hearing. Prompt
appeal and decision safeguard not only the interest of the child, but
also those of the aggrieved adult parties.' 85 Although initial hearings
were held quickly in each of the three principal cases, postplacement
appeals concerning the termination of parental rights lasted at least
two years in each case. That is simply inexcusable. Swifter judicial
decisions and appeals will prevent the emotional bonding between the
child and the adoptive family that only strengthens as time goes on.
When minimal bonding has occurred, however, the adoptive parents
183. In re Adoption of E.A.W., 647 So. 2d 918, 925 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (Pariente, J.,
concurring) (acknowledging that the potential damage to the child increases as the trial and
appellate processes are prolonged), affd, 658 So. 2d 961 (Fla. 1995); Doe 1I, 638 N.E.2d 181, 186
(Ill.) (McMorrow, J., concurring) ("Delay damages the child, regardless of who is eventually
awarded custody of the child"), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 499, and cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 499 (1994);
J.M.P., 528 So. 2d at 1016; Sanchez v. L.D.S. Soc. Servs., 680 P.2d 753, 755 (Utah 1984).
184. JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL-, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 42 (1979). The
authors argue that the need to protect the child should outweigh the need for legal certainty:
While the taking of time is often correctly equated with care, reasoned judgment, and
the assurance of fairness, it often also reflects too large and burdensome caseloads or
inefficiently deployed resources. Whatever the cause of the time-taking, the costs as
well as the benefits of the delay to the child must be weighed. Our guideline would
allow for no more delay than that required for reasoned judgment. By reasoned judg-
ment we do not mean certainty of judgment. We mean no more than the most reason-
able judgment that can be made within the time available-measured to accord with
the child's sense of time.
Id. at 42-43.
185. Id. at 46. Quick hearings are vital, because if they are "scheduled and conducted at the
normal pace of other civil proceedings, the child often will have become psychologically attached
to the adoptive parents before the hearing and cannot be returned to his biological parent with-
out subjecting him to the risk of permanent mental and emotional harm." J.M.P., 528 So. 2d at
1016.
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may be less reluctant to relinquish the child to the natural parents
after an unfavorable court decision.
186
Recent statutory amendments in Iowa and Illinois emphasize that
courts must hear adoption cases on an expedited basis. For example,
Iowa's amendment provides that the state supreme court "may adopt
rules which provide for the expediting of contested cases" concerning
adoption petitions and termination of parental rights.187 Illinois now
dictates that appealable questions on these issues "shall be heard on
an expedited basis.' 88 It is not enough, however, for courts merely to
consider adoption cases on an expedited basis. Courts must resolve
these cases more swiftly as well.
The Baby Emily case perfectly illustrates the delays which plague
the judicial system. Less than two months after Baby Emily was born,
the trial judge conducted a hearing concerning the natural father's pa-
rental rights and decided that issue just one week later. The trial
judge, however, agreed to rehear the case and did not resolve it until
Emily was thirteen months old. The Florida District Court of Appeal
was faced with the same problem. A three-judge panel of that court
initially considered the appeal but did not issue a decision until Emily
was almost twenty-two months old. Like the trial judge, the appellate
court also agreed to rehear the case; its en banc decision came over
five months later, when Emily was twenty-seven months old. There is
simply no excuse for such delays when their primary result is to fur-
ther jeopardize the child's already fragile well-being. 189
One method of reducing the inherent delays is to impose fixed
deadlines on courts to hear and decide adoption cases. In In re
J.M.P., the Louisiana Supreme Court imposed such a framework for
decisions at the trial and appellate levels.' 90 Since many of the delays
186. For example, in the Baby Pete case in Vermont, the adoptive parents agreed to return
the child to the natural parents after they lost the first round in court, rather than appeal the
decision, because of the harm delay would cause to the child. Ironically, the natural father con-
sidered the potential damage to his child and let Baby Pete remain in the physical custody of his
adoptive parents. The natural father and the adoptive mother shared legal custody. This case is
discussed infra notes 242-249 and accompanying text.
187. IOWA CODE § 600.14 (1995).
188. 750 ILCS § 50/20b (West 1995) (amended 1995).
189. Of course, fact-finding may be an inherently time-consuming process in any adoption
case, particularly where the testimony of the parties will be contradictory. See Baby E.A.W., 647
So. 2d at 931 (Pariente, J., specially concurring). Nonetheless, because the ultimate goal of
adoption law is to protect the child's well-being, courts should focus on making quick, "rea-
soned" judgments rather than striving for legal certainty. See GOLDSTEiN ET AL., supra note 181,
at 42-43.
190. J.M.P., 528 So. 2d at 1017. The court, exercising its supervisory jurisdiction, imposed a
three-step process designed to expedite adoption cases and recommended "to each judicial and
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which occurred in the three principal cases occurred at the appellate
level, J.M.P.'s mandate regarding appeals should be incorporated by
courts and legislatures: "The court of appeal shall hear and decide an
appeal taken from the trial court within twenty days of the lodging of
the record on appeal." 191 If appeals must be filed within one week of
a court's decision and the twenty-day rule is imposed, the entire ap-
pellate process should take no more than a few months, and final
placement could occur before the child is six months old.192
In addition to reducing the time needed for making decisions, the
lengthy "waiting period" which adoptive parents must endure before
adoptions are legally finalized should be eliminated. 193 "[T]he 'wait-
ing period' is, as the name suggests, a period of uncertainty for adult
and child. It is a period of probation encumbered by investigative vis-
its and the fear of interruption. It is not, as it ought to be, a full op-
portunity for developing secure and stable attachments.' ' 194
Moreover, "all of the continuity problems attributable to the waiting
period are exacerbated by the lengthy opportunity for appeal follow-
ing a final decree."'1 95 In order to facilitate stable, healthy environ-
ments in which adopted children grow up, some psychologists have
argued that the adoption decree should be finalized the moment
placement with the adoptive family occurs. 196 Alternatively, the Uni-
form Adoption Act gives a birth parent the absolute right to revoke
consent to the adoption within the first eight days after birth.197 One
might argue that finality would jeopardize the constitutional rights of
legislative reform body that this problem be addressed and that remedial legislation and court
rule changes be proposed as soon as possible." Id.
191. Id. (emphasis added).
192. The effectiveness of the deadlines is dependent, of course, on strict adherence by all
courts involved. See, e.g., In re JWR, 607 So. 2d 634, 637 (La. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 607 So. 2d
571 (La. 1992) ("This court is now required to decide this case, the procedural history of which
was conducted in total disregard of In re JMP."). Critics might argue that an expedited decision
is simply an unrealistic goal in an adoption case. But, judges often consider and rule on requests
for temporary restraining orders quickly, and there is no valid reason why they cannot resolve
adoption cases expeditiously as well. It would help, of course, if the attorneys in an adoption
case clearly raise the need for expediency to the judge. As the Illinois Appellate Court noted,
this was not done in the Baby Richard case. See supra note 182.
193. Most states require waiting periods of 60-180 days after the child is placed before a final
order of adoption is entered. See Heather M. Little, Adoption Law Consistency Would Cut Pain,
PLAIN DEALER, Aug. 8, 1993, at 1C.
194. GoLSTE-N, supra note 184, at 35.
195. Id. at 37.
196. Id. at 36. This suggestion may be too harsh. Natural parents should have a short period
of time to recover from the pregnancy before they forever relinquish their rights to raise their
child.
197. UNF. ADOPTION Acr § 2-404(a). After that eight-day period, consent may only be
revoked before the adoption decree is issued and only if there is clear and convincing evidence
that the consent was obtained on the basis of fraud or duress. Id. § 2-408(b)(1).
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putative fathers who are unaware the adoption took place. Use of a
putative father registry, however, would protect the father's rights by
ensuring him of notice of any proposed adoption. The father would
then be able to intervene and contest the adoption before placement
occurred.
Although the waiting period before an adoption is finalized
should be shortened, the existence of a waiting period before the child
is given up for adoption is critical and should not be eliminated. This
waiting period "give[s] the mother time to assess how she feels about
adoption-during pregnancy and for a short time thereafter."'198 In
the Baby Jessica case, one portion of Cara's petition to revoke consent
to the adoption was based on the fact that she consented just forty
hours after birth, instead of at least seventy-two hours as required by
statute.199 Had the waiting period not been violated in Jessica's case,
Cara might have been honest about the natural father's true identity
and the protracted custody dispute would never have occurred.200
Legislation that expedites adoption proceedings is necessary be-
cause postplacement custody disputes between adoptive and biologi-
cal parents will continue to linger for years without resolution. 201
Notwithstanding any emotional bonding with the child, lengthy cus-
tody disputes leave the adoptive parents on shaky ground and may
affect their treatment of the child: "[A]doptive parents may involun-
tarily inhibit the development of a strong bond of nurture and love
with a child for fear that the child may be taken from them. That fear
may deny the emotional support the child obviously needs. '202 There-
fore, rapid placement with no resulting uncertainty as to the finality of
the adoption is essential. "The law favors rapid placement so that the
198. FIELD, supra note 102, at 91. Most states currently have mandatory waiting periods that
range from twelve to seventy-two hours after birth. See UNE'. ADOPTION AcT § 2-404 cmt.
199. In re B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d 239, 243 (Iowa 1992). The Iowa Supreme Court did not spe-
cifically decide the waiver issue, noting only that "[w]e do not suggest that a mother cannot
waive the seventy-two hour requirement . I..." it Cara's execution of consent so quickly after
birth, notwithstanding Iowa's statutory requirements, may be attributed to the fact that she did
not have her own lawyer. Thus, independent legal counsel is necessary so a natural parent un-
derstands the effects that relinquishing a child will have on his or her parental rights. See infra
notes 230-35 and accompanying text. Iowa's amended Adoption Act now states that the 72-hour
requirement may not be waived by either natural parent. IOWA CODE § 600A.4(2)(g) (1995).
Additionally, any person who accepts a release of custody "prior to the expiration of the sev-
enty-two-hour period required is guilty of a serious misdemeanor." Id. § 600A.10(2).
200. See infra note 230 and accompanying text.
201. The lengthy legal battles in the three principal cases are not unusual. See, e.g., In re
Baby Boy C., 630 A.2d 670 (D.C. 1993) (nine years), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 58 (1994); In re
M.N.M., 605 A.2d 921,921 (D.C.) (four years), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 636 (1992); Robert 0., 604
N.E.2d 99, 99 (N.Y. 1992) (four years); In re BJB, 888 P.2d 216, 216 (Wyo. 1995) (four years).
202. P and P v. Children's Servs. Div., 673 P.2d 864, 868 (Or. Ct. App. 1983).
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child can bond with those who will be the legal parents and not with
those from whom the child may be taken. This sound policy benefits
the child, the natural parents, the prospective adoptive parents, and
society." 20
3
In order to protect the best interests of the child, the entire adop-
tion process must be finalized as soon as possible. "When no one per-
son has cared for an infant for more than a few months, the child
should not yet have developed a dependency on any one person at the
time of placement. ' 204 The Uniform Adoption Act recognizes the
need for finality by limiting all challenges to adoption decrees and
orders terminating parental rights to six months, notwithstanding the
basis of the challenge.205 A better option is to shorten this limit to
three months so that placement may occur within six months after
birth.206
B. Putative Father Registries
An ideal solution to the conflict between the putative father's
rights and the best interests of the child is to place the burden on the
putative father to assert his parental rights before the birth of the
child. Requiring affirmative action by the father is justified because
"[t]he opportunity to exercise responsibility for the care and protec-
tion of a child begins before the child's birth. ' 207 Consequently, sev-
eral states208 have enacted a "putative father registry," which provides
203. In re Juvenile Severance Action No. S-114487, 876 P.2d 1121, 1132 (Ariz. 1994) (en
banc).
204. Doe I, 627 N.E.2d 648, 664 n.1 (Tully, P.J., dissenting) (citing psychological studies that
indicate that placing an infant in a new environment at this stage should not adversely affect the
child), rev'd, 638 N.E.2d 181 (ILL.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 499, and cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 499
(1994).
205. See UNIF. ADOPON Acr § 3-707(d): "A decree of adoption or other order issued
under this [Act] is not subject to a challenge begun more than six months after the decree or
order is issued."
206. See, e.g., GOLDsTEIN ET AL., supra note 184, at 43 ("Three months may not be a long
time for an adult decisionmaker. For a young child it may be forever."). Recent research has
indicated that "an infant forms the strongest bonds in the first six months of life-after which the
trauma of changing caregivers increases with age." See Lidia Wasowicz, Adoption Least Trau-
matic in Infancy, UPI, Feb. 20, 1995 (citing psychologists' conclusions). Therefore, a two-month
limit should be imposed on challenges to adoption decrees and orders, rather than the six-month
limit proposed in the Uniform Adoption Act. See supra note 205. A two-month limit, coupled
with swift judicial decisions and appeals, will enable final placement to occur before the child is
six months old.
207. In re Baby Girl K., 335 N.W.2d 846, 851 (Wis. 1983).
208. See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-106.01 (West Supp. 1994); ARK CODE. ANN. § 20-18-702
(Michie 1991); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-11-9(d) (1992); IDAHO CODE § 16-1513 (1994); IOWA CODE
§ 144.12A (1995) (amended 1995); 750 ILCS § 50/12.1 (West 1995) (amended 1995); IND. CODE
ANN. § 31-3-1.5-6 (Bums 1994); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:400 (West 1991); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 192.016 (Vernon Supp. 1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-5-20 (Michie Supp. 1993); N.Y. Soc.
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automatic notice of a pending adoption to a father who has filed with
the state's department of health.209 These registries typically require
any unwed man who claims to have fathered a child to register any
time before or within a short period after the birth of the child in
order to receive notice of any adoption proceedings.
210
Those states that have enacted putative father registries interpret
them strictly against putative fathers, thereby avoiding lengthy and
destructive custody disputes.211 For example, lack of knowledge of
the pregnancy is not deemed a legitimate reason for failing to file.
212
One court has held that a putative father's lack of knowledge about
the registry's existence is also not a valid defense:
It is not too harsh to require that those responsible for bringing chil-
dren into the world outside the established institution of marriage
should be required either to comply with those statutes that accord
them the opportunity to assert their parental rights or to yield to the
method established by society to raise children in a manner best
suited to promote their welfare.
21 3
SERV. LAW § 372-c (McKinney 1992); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 55.1 (West 1987); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 36-2-209 (1991); UTAH CODE AN. § 78-30-4.8 (Michie Supp. 1994); Wyo. STAT. § 1-22-
117 (1995).
209. The registry usually records the name, address, social security number, and any other
relevant information about the putative father so that when an adoption petition is filed, he will
receive notice of and be able to take part in the proceedings. Alexandra R. Dapolito, Comment,
The Failure to Notify Putative Fathers of Adoption Proceedings: Balancing the Adoption Equa-
tion, 42 CATH. U. L. REV. 979, 1021 (1993).
210. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-106.01B (any time before birth but no later than
thirty days after birth); IDAHO CODE § 16-1513(2) (prior to birth or "must be registered prior to
the date of any termination proceeding, or proceeding wherein the child is placed with an agency
licensed to provide adoption services"); 750 ILCS § 50/12.1(b) (any time before birth but no
later than thirty days after birth); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-3-1.5-12 (prior to birth or within thirty
days after birth or the date of a filing of a petition to adopt, whichever occurs later); UTAH CODE
ANN.. § 78-30-4.8(2) (prior to birth or either before the child is relinquished to a licensed agency
or an adoption petition is filed).
211. Dapolito, supra note 209, at 1023. For example, the Utah Supreme Court held that a
putative father who registered one day after his child was placed with an adoption service and
just four days after the child was born had nonetheless waived his parental rights. Sanchez v.
L.D.S. Soc. Servs., 680 P.2d 753, 756 (Utah 1984). "It is of no constitutional importance that [the
putative father] came close to complying with the statute. Because of the nature of subject
matter dealt with by the statute, a firm cutoff date is reasonable, if not essential." Id. at 755; see
also In re Adoption of Reeves, 831 S.W.2d 607, 608 (Ark. 1992) (father who failed to register
waived right to set aside adoption decree, even though father had already developed a "signifi-
cant relationship" with the child).
212. See, e.g., ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-106.01F; 750 ILCS § 50/12.1(g). These require-
ments are certainly justified because all putative fathers "are aware that sexual intercourse may
result in pregnancy, and of the potential opportunity to establish a family. If they wish to protect
that opportunity, they can do so by maintaining some relationship with the women with whom
they had intercourse to determine whether they become pregnant." Clausen II, 502 N.W.2d at
687 (Levin, J., dissenting).
213. Sanchez, 680 P.2d at 756.
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Thus, the failure to register may have permanent effects on a putative
father's parental rights. 214
Although Illinois did not have a putative father registry when its
supreme court decided the Baby Richard case, the Illinois legislature
quickly responded by amending the State's Adoption Act one month
later to include a registry.215 Iowa also enacted such a registry in
1994.216 The majority of states, however, do not have registries and
should not wait for protracted custody disputes in their own courts
before they respond to the problem. 217 The lamentable outcomes in
the three principal cases should motivate other states to amend their
adoption laws.
Putative fathers are not unfairly burdened by use of a registry. It
is hardly unreasonable to require a natural father who is truly inter-
ested in raising his child to register with the state. The registration
process is simple and ensures the father that he will be notified if
someone seeks to adopt his child. By registering, the father may inter-
vene and contest the adoption without later claiming he was the victim
of fraud. In that respect, the registry acts as an "insurance policy"
against attempted fraud and protects the rights of fathers who are
committed to raising their children:
The purpose of the putative father registry is to protect the parental
rights of fathers who affirmatively assume responsibility for children
they may have fathered and to expedite adoptions of children
whose biological fathers are unwilling to assume responsibility for
their children by registering with the putative father registry or
otherwise acknowledging their children.218
214. For example, in Indiana, the failure to file constitutes a waiver of notice of the adoption
proceeding and can be implied, irrevocable consent to the adoption. IND. CODE ANN. § 31-3-1.5-
16. In Arizona, a putative father "who does not file ... waives his right to be notified of any
judicial hearing regarding the child's adoption and his consent to the adoption [sic] not re-
quired." 1995 Ajuz. SEss. LAws 221, *2 (to be codified at ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-106.01E);
see also UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-304.8(4). Illinois' Adoption Act incorporates the waiver of
notice provisions and also specifies that the failure to register "shall constitute an abandonment
of the child and shall be prima facie evidence of sufficient grounds to support termination of
such father's parental rights under this Act." 750 ILCS § 50/12.1(h); see also IDAHO CODE § 16-
1513(3).
215. See supra note 208.
216. Id.
217. See id. Although Illinois and Iowa amended their adoption statutes in 1994, Florida did
not. In February 1994, a bill amending Florida's Adoption Act, which would have established a
putative father registry, passed in the Florida House, but was defeated by Florida's Senate Judi-
ciary Committee. See Cruel Adoption Laws Turn Babies Into Pawns, supra note 82, at 12A. A
new adoption reform bill was recently introduced in the state legislature, however. See Debbie
Cenziper, Adoption Law Up For a Change, SUN-SENrNEL (Fort Lauderdale), Feb. 14, 1995, at
lB.
218. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-5-20(A).
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Thus, a putative father registry is "an ideal option for state legisla-
tures, because it balances protection of an unwed father's interests
with the state's interest in finalizing adoptions. ' 219 If state legislatures
are truly committed to protecting the best interests of children and
preventing lengthy and emotionally charged custody disputes, they
will enact putative father registries.
One final point is of critical importance-all states must make
diligent and consistent efforts to publicize the existence of these regis-
tries so that putative fathers will be well-informed of their rights and
responsibilities. It is vital that each state "post in a conspicuous place
a notice that informs the public about the purpose and operation of
the registry. '220 Although the failure to post such a notice should
"not relieve a putative father of the obligation to register,"'221 a puta-
tive father registry will be meaningless without widespread publicity
of its existence.
C. Mandatory Preplacement Counseling
A third focus of legislative reform should include mandatory
counseling for natural parents. Along with putative father registries, a
counseling requirement will help minimize fraudulent adoptions by
ensuring that natural parents make decisions with informed consent.
Both parents should receive personal and legal counseling prior to
placing a child for adoption and, preferably, well-before the child is
219. Dapolito, supra note 209, at 1021; see also Karen C. Welmer, Comment, Daddy Wants
Rights Too: A Perspective on Adoption Statutes, 31 Hous. L. REV. 691, 717-18 (1994) ("If all
states incorporated such a registry into their statutes, courts would spend less time determining
who the father is. This would provide the putative father greater protection as the court could
check the registers of many different states before terminating his rights.").
220. IND. CODE ANN. § 31-3-1.5-13(b); see also Dapolito, supra note 209, at 1025 (publicity
necessary for a successful registry). Illinois does not have a specific statutory provision regarding
publicity of its registry, and only sixty-seven men had registered during the first year after the
registry was enacted. Michael Gillis, State Dads Gain Voice in Adoption, Cm. SuN-Trmms, July 2,
1995, at 3. Indiana, on the other hand, makes a statutory effort to publicize its registry by requir-
ing each hospital, local health department, clerk of a circuit court, and branch office of the Bu-
reau of Motor Vehicles to post information about the registry. IND. CODE ANN. § 31-3-1.5-13(b).
Oklahoma also requires its Department of Human Services to "provide, from any available
funds, for the publication and statewide distribution to the public of information as to the exist-
ence of the paternity registry." OKLA STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 55.1(G)(2). Because the success of
Oklahoma's provision is contingent on the availability of funds, however, it may be ineffective.
Therefore, each state must allocate money for the explicit purpose of publicizing its registry.
Furthermore, I would expound on Indiana's list by posting information and registration forms at
all post offices, train and bus stations, and libraries. Each state should make public service an-
nouncements on television and radio as well.
221. IND. CODE ANN. § 31-3-1.5-13(c)(5).
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even born.222 A few states have incorporated counseling provisions
into their adoption statutes. 223 For example, California specifies that
at least three counseling sessions must be offered to each birth parent
before that parent may place a child for adoption.2 24 Similarly, Iowa's
amended Adoption Act now requires that before custody of a child
may be released, three hours of counseling must be offered to the bio-
logical parent.22 5 In addition, the Uniform Adoption Act dictates that
before a natural parent may execute consent to an adoption, the par-
ent "must have been informed of the meaning and consequences of
adoption" as well as the "availability of personal and legal
counseling. '"226
The problem with statutes that dictate only that counseling be
available is that those parents who do not take advantage of this op-
tion will not receive information that might influence their decision.
Because the goal is to ensure that the parent makes an informed, vol-
untary decision before releasing the child, counseling should be
mandatory, not optional. An effective example of a mandatory re-
quirement is found in Louisiana's Children's Code, which requires a
parent to submit to a minimum of two counseling sessions with a li-
censed mental health specialist before executing consent to an adop-
tion.227 This provision guarantees that adoption decisions are made
222. See, e.g., LINDA C. BURGESS, THE ART OF ADOPTON 6 (1981) ("Counseling is most
effective over a period of several months before the birth of the child.").
223. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 8801.3(a), 8801.5(d) (West Supp. 1995); IOWA CODE
§ 600A.4(2)(d) (1995); LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. arts. 1120-21 (West 1995); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 19, § 1112(2) (West Supp. 1994); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-39.1(b) (West Supp. 1994).
224. CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 8801.3(a), 8801.5(d). If accepted, the counseling sessions must be
at least fifty minutes in length and held on different days. Id. § 8801.5(d). Upon request of the
birth parent, the adoptive parents must pay for both the costs of counseling and the costs of
separate legal counsel for the birth parent. Id § 8801.5(c)(4)-(5). California also requires that
the counseling sessions include an explanation of the alternatives to adoption, the alternative
types of adoption, and the rights and responsibilities of the birth parent with respect to adoption.
Id. § 8801.5(c)(1)-(3). Maine also dictates that counseling be offered to the natural parents. ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 1112(2)(A) (a court may approve a consent to surrender the child
only if "[a] licensed child placing agency or the department [of human services] certifies to the
court that counseling was provided or was offered and refused"). New Jersey's statute is very
broad; it requires only that the birth parent "be offered counseling as to his or her options other
than placement of the child for adoption." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-39.1(b).
225. IOWA CODE § 600A.4(2)(d) (1995). If the biological parent accepts this offer, the coun-
seling "shall be provided after the birth of the child and prior to the signing of a release of
custody or the filing of a petition for termination of parental rights as applicable." Id. This
counseling requirement, however, would enable a woman still suffering from the stresses of preg-
nancy and labor to legally release her rights to the child. Such a situation could easily be avoided
by starting counseling before the child is born. See supra note 222 and accompanying text.
226. Un. ADOTON Acr § 2-404(e) (emphasis added).
227. LA. CIULD. CODE ANN. art. 1120(A). A father is entitled to waive this requirement,
however. Id. art. 1120(C). Unless waived by a court for good cause, New Mexico also requires
mandatory counseling before a natural parent may consent to adoption or relinquish parental
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with informed consent and may thus prevent at least some potential
adoption disputes from occurring.
The advantage of counseling prior to birth is that it will prevent
later attempts to annul the adoption on the ground that the stresses of
pregnancy and labor unduly influenced the decision. 228 When coun-
seling is provided and a woman chooses to place her child for adop-
tion, "the commitment to adoption will be more consciously taken and
better understood. This type of plan lends itself to a reduced risk for
all involved parties and provides honest and more comprehensive in-
formation about herself and the biological father. '229
In addition to personal counseling, natural parents need in-
dependent legal counseling to prevent "coerced" adoptions by attor-
neys who represent the adoptive parents. This is a crucial
requirement that may have made a difference in each of the principal
cases. "[B]irth parents mustn't be pushed into decisions they will later
regret. Cara Schmidt signed away her parental rights just 40 hours
after giving birth, a time when any woman is emotionally exhausted.
She got no counseling to brace her for the grief that would follow, and
she never had a lawyer. ' 230 Similarly, the Illinois Supreme Court
noted in the Baby Richard case that the attorney for the adoptive par-
ents both handled the initial placement of the child and "failed to
make any effort to ascertain the name or address of the father despite
the fact that the mother indicated she knew who he was."'231 Finally,
in the Baby Emily case, attorney Charlotte Danciu acted as an "inter-
rights. N.M. STAT. ANN. 32A-5-22(A)-(B). The parent must be "counseled individually without
the presence of any other person for a minimum of one counseling session," and a minor parent
must receive counseling on at least two separate occasions. Id. § 32A-5-22(D). For all parents,
the counseling session must include a discussion of "alternatives to and the consequences of
adoption." Id. § 32A-5-22(C)(2).
228. LA. CMLD. CODE ANN. art. 1120 cmt. a (this ground is "often asserted" as a basis for
annulling a surrender of a child). "Such counseling sessions may also assist a parent in preparing
for and adjusting to the grieving process of surrendering a child for adoption." Id.
229. Ellyn Wieselman, In Adoption We Must Heed the Unheard Voice, Cn. TRIB., Dec. 11,
1994, (WOMANEWS), at 11.
230. Geoffrey Cowley et al., Who's Looking After the Interests of Children?, NEWSWEEK,
Aug. 16, 1993, at 55.
231. Doe II, 638 N.E.2d 181, 182 (I11.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 499, and cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
499 (1994). The court expounded on this point when it rejected the adoptive parents' request for
a custody hearing based on the best interests of the child:
Curiously, the record is devoid of any effort by the Does' lawyer to contact Daniella's
beauty school instructor or any of Daniella's friends or relatives in an attempt to obtain
Otto's identity. Nor was any attempt made to learn Otto's name by checking out the
address that Daniella and Otto had shared for over a year prior to Richard's birth and
where Otto still lived. In short, no reasonable inquiry was made.
In re Kirchner, 649 N.E.2d 324, 326-27 (Ill.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2599, and cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 2600 (1995).
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mediary" but her conduct has also been questioned by the Florida
courts.
2 3 2
An ideal example of a legal counseling requirement can be found
in Louisiana's Children's Code, which mandates that a natural parent
who executes a consent to adoption must be represented by an attor-
ney who does not represent the adoptive parents.2 33 "This legal coun-
seling requirement, like the mental health counseling requirement,
aims to protect the surrendering parent from making an unwise deci-
sion and to reinforce the finality of adoptions by precluding later chal-
lenges. '234 The Uniform Adoption Act also specifies that a natural
parent's consent may be taken only by a lawyer who does not repre-
sent an adoptive parent or an adoption agency to which the child will
be relinquished. 235 It should be incumbent upon every state legisla-
ture to implement similar requirements and assure that all natural
parents receive personal and legal counseling before placement of a
child occurs.
232. Both opinions of the appellate court questioned Danciu's conduct. The appellate
court's 2-1 opinion, after acknowledging Danciu's failure to inform the trial judge of her tele-
phone conversation with Bjorklund in which he expressly objected to the adoption, continued:
We are just as appalled to learn that there is later testimony of the prospective adoptive
parents that the attorney likewise failed to inform them of Gary's objection and refusal
to consent until after the birth of the baby. We cannot help but think that a little candor
from this intermediary might have prevented some of what occurred later.
In re Adoption of Baby E.A.W., 647 So. 2d 918, 943 app. (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (en banc),
affd, 658 So. 2d 961 (Fla. 1995). In the en banc decision, the appellate court again criticized
Danciu on similar grounds. See supra note 86. Accusations of misconduct have also been di-
rected at Danciu by other lawyers who have dealt with her in adoption cases. See, e.g., Larry
Barszewski, Adoption Lawyer Sometimes Stirs Up Controversy, SUN-SENnNEL (Fort Lauder-
dale), Feb. 9, 1995, at 1B; Debbie Cenziper, Heartbroken Couple to Give Baby Back to Birth
Parents, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Feb. 5, 1995, at B1.
233. LA. CiUnD. CODE ANN. art. 1121(A). In addition, the natural parent's attorney must
execute an affidavit which states that the attorney fully explained the consequences of surrender-
ing the child to the parent. Id. art. 1121(C). The purpose of this provision is "to provide some
further insurance that the parent has knowingly executed the surrender and to provide further
insulation against a subsequent challenge to the surrender process on the grounds that the par-
ent was ignorant or misunderstood the nature of the surrender document." Id. at cmt. c.
234. Deborah Pearce-Reggio, Comment, Children's Law Matures: Surrender and Adoption
under Louisiana's New Children's Code, 67 TUL. L. REV. 1631, 1649 (1993); see also Korn, supra
note 181, at 1323 ("With mandatory legal and psychological counseling, birth mothers would be
better prepared both to make the decision and to understand the emotional and legal conse-
quences of relinquishing a child for adoption.").
235. UNiF. ADOPTION AcT § 2-405(a)(4). "To avoid even the appearance of a conflict of
interest, a consent or relinquishment has to be executed before a 'neutral' individual, who has to
attest to the apparent validity of the consent or relinquishment." Id. § 2-404 cmt. In light of
potential conflict of interest, confidentiality and zealous representation problems, other com-
mentators have argued that independent legal counseling should be incorporated in future legis-
lative reforms. See, e.g., Carol S. Silverman, Regulating Independent Adoptions, 22 COLUM. J.L.
& Soc. PRoas. 323, 349 (1989); Maria L. Tenuta, Independent Adoptions in Minnesota: A Decade
of Controversy and Opposition Mandates Legislative Reform, 13 HAMIUNE J. Pun. L. & POL'Y
381, 391 (1992).
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D. Penalizing Fraud
Reform is also necessary to dissuade all parties involved in an
adoption case from acting fraudulently. As Justice Levin noted in his
ardent dissent in the Michigan Supreme Court, the absence of fraud
might have prevented the Baby Jessica case from ever getting started:
The sympathetic portrayal of the Schmidts in the majority opinion
ignores that it was Cara Schmidt's fraud on the Iowa court and on
Daniel Schmidt that is at the root of this controversy. If she had
identified Daniel Schmidt as the father when she consented to
waive her parental rights, before she had a change of heart, he too
might have relinquished his parental rights. If Daniel Schmidt had
refused to relinquish his rights, the DeBoers would not have as-
sumed custody of the child and this litigation would have been
avoided.
236
In the Baby Richard case, the Illinois Supreme Court implicated
Daniela Janikova for fraudulently concealing Richard's birth but em-
phasized that the adoptive parents and their attorney were culpable as
well:
To the extent that it is relevant to assign fault in this case, the fault
here lies initially with the mother, who fraudulently tried to deprive
the father of his rights, and secondly, with the adoptive parents and
their attorney, who proceeded with the adoption when they knew
that a real father was out there who had been denied knowledge of
his baby's existence. When the father entered his appearance in the
adoption proceedings 57 days after the baby's birth and demanded
his rights as a father, the petitioners should have relinquished the
baby at that time. It was their decision to prolong this litigation
through a lengthy, and ultimately fruitless, appeal.
237
Ironically, both natural mothers, after acting fraudulently, reconciled
and eventually married the natural fathers. 238 When Daniel Schmidt
and Otakar Kirchner later won their respective legal battles, Jessica
and Richard were "returned" to their natural parents. Thus, the end
result in both cases was that the natural mothers "benefited" from
236. Clausen II, 502 N.W.2d 649, 686 (Mich. 1993) (per curiam) (Levin, J., dissenting). Of
course, the DeBoers are as much to blame for the result of the case as anyone. Despite Cara's
fraud, the DeBoers knew the adoption had not been finalized; they nonetheless ignored the
orders of the Iowa courts and sought refuge in Michigan. See supra notes 28-44 and accompany-
ing text.
237. Doe II, 638 N.E.2d 181, 182 (I1.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 499, and cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
499 (1994).
238. Cara and Daniel Schmidt were married in April 1992. See Edward Walsh, Two Parents
Too Many for a Little Girl, WASH. PosT, June 4, 1993, at C1, C9. Daniela and Otakar Kirchner
were married in September 1991. Doe I, 627 N.E.2d 648, 651 (II. App. Ct. 1993), rev'd, 638
N.E.2d 181 (ILL.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 499, and cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 499 (1994).
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their own fraud and regained physical custody of their children.239
Such fraudulent conduct may discourage future adoptions: "[N]o nor-
mal couple would undertake to adopt a child and risk establishing the
supreme ties of affection and concern that exist between parents and
child if they were in constant jeopardy of having their child ripped
from their arms by a returning natural parent. '240
Unfortunately, fraud similar to that perpetrated by Cara and
Daniela arises frequently in adoption cases. 241 For example, the Baby
Pete242 case in Vermont, which was settled just a few months after the
Schmidts regained custody of Baby Jessica, also involved fraud by the
natural mother. Baby Pete was given up for adoption shortly after
birth by Angela Harriman, the natural mother, and Marcus Stoddard,
the man she named as the child's father.243 Daniel Harriman, An-
gela's estranged husband, did not learn of the adoption until six weeks
later, but Baby Pete had already been released to Donna and Richard
McDurfee, a Vermont couple.2 " Claiming that he was the real father,
Harriman then sued to assert his parental rights; blood tests ordered
239. This is arguably an unjust result. See, e.g., Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188, 190 (N.Y. 1889)
(establishing the well-recognized legal principle that "[n]o one shall be permitted to profit by his
own fraud, or to take advantage of his own wrong"). Indeed, Justice Levin's dissent in the Mich-
igan Supreme Court criticized the majority for not being "troubled that the result of its decision
will be to return the child to Cara Schmidt despite her fraud." Clausen II, 502 N.W.2d at 687
(Levin, J., dissenting); see also In re Kirchner, 649 N.E.2d 324, 344 (I1.) (per curiam) (McMor-
row, J., dissenting) ("Daniella's deceit is being rewarded and she is able to circumvent her relin-
quishment of maternal rights and custody ...."), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2599, and cert. denied,
115 S. Ct. 2600 (1995).
240. Wooten v. Wallace, 351 S.E.2d 72, 75 (W. Va. 1986); see also Goodman, supra note 179
and accompanying text (arguing that the result of the Baby Jessica case will be to deter prospec-
tive adoptive parents from adopting).
241. In the past few years, there have been several other cases where the natural mother
placed the child for adoption without the father's knowledge, even though she knew the identity
of the father. See, e.g., In re Juvenile Severance Action No. S-114487, 876 P.2d 1121, 1125 (Ariz.
1994) (en banc) (father opposed adoption before birth, but mother released the child shortly
after birth without the father's knowledge); In re M.N.M., 605 A.2d 921, 922 (D.C.), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 636 (1992) (after mother travelled to and placed child for adoption in District of
Columbia, she refused to identify father despite knowing his identity and his location in Mis-
souri, where she had given birth); Nale v. Robertson, 871 S.W.2d 674, 675-76 (Tenn. 1994)
(mother surrendered child for adoption even though father told her before birth that he wanted
custody if she did not); see also the Baby Pete case, discussed infra notes 242-49 and accompany-
ing text.
242. Although his birth name was James M. Stoddard, the child was renamed Peter by his
adoptive parents. See Indira A.R. Lakshmanan & Bob Hohler, Vt. Adoption Turning into Cus-
tody Fight, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 10, 1993, at 9.
243. In court, Angela swore in an affidavit that Marcus was the child's natural father. See
Sally Johnson, Adoption's Tangled Web, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 30, 1993, at A13.
244. The McDurfees had raised Pete since the day after his birth on November 24, 1992. Id.
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by the probate court later revealed that there was a 99.94 percent
chance that Daniel Harriman was indeed the biological father.2 45
Ironically, the Baby Pete case had a happy ending. The
McDurfees decided that if they lost the first round in court, they
would return the child rather than appeal the decision. 246 Although
Daniel Harriman would likely have prevailed in court,247 he also con-
sidered the best interests of his child and the dispute was settled ami-
cably.2 48 The unique settlement terms provided that the McDurfees
would retain physical custody of Baby Pete and Daniel Harriman
would share legal custody with Donna McDurfee.249 But as the Baby
Jessica and Baby Richard cases illustrate, many cases involving fraud
are bitterly contested and not resolved amicably.
Although courts generally recognize that a fraudulently induced
consent to adoption is invalid,250 the issue of fraud is more compli-
cated when the natural parent is entirely excluded from the adoption
proceedings. Certainly, a strong argument can be made that a parent
"who loses all rights to his children has a great interest in having a
right to challenge an adoption decree from which he was fraudulently
excluded."' 25' On the other hand, protecting the best interests of the
child requires that limits be placed on the time in which a parent may
challenge an adoption decree or an order terminating parental rights
on the basis of fraud. The need for restrictions is illustrated by Louisi-
245. These test results also rebutted the portion of Angela's sworn affidavit in which she
denied having had sexual relations with Daniel Harriman since early 1991. Id.
246. See For Once, the Baby Won, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 1993, at A18. The McDurfees stated
that they made their decision in order to protect the best interests of the child. A Familiar
Custody Case, a Different Decision, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 29, 1993, at 28.
247. Although Angela and Marcus gave up the baby, Daniel Harriman was the biological
father and was still legally married to Angela when Baby Pete was born. He therefore had an
"overwhelming legal advantage" that Daniel Schmidt did not have in the Baby Jessica case. For
Once, the Baby Won, supra note 246, at A18. This advantage stems from the fact that "[t]he
married father is, from the outset, legally responsible to support the child. The unmarried father
has no such automatic legal responsibility." In re Adoption of Baby E.A.W., 647 So. 2d 918, 923
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (en banc), affd, 658 So. 2d 961 (Fla. 1995).
248. See, e.g., Agreement Reached in Adoption Battle, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Aug. 21, 1993,
at 7A.
249. Richard McDurfee, the adoptive father, summarized the result: "Nobody lost and the
baby won." For Once, the Baby Won, supra note 246, at A18. The settlement also entitled
Daniel Harriman to "visitation rights and a voice in his [son's] upbringing." Id. The judge's
order approving the settlement officially changed the child's name on the birth certificate to
Peter Elliot Harriman McDurfee. See Judith Gaines, 'Unique' Adoption Ruling, BOSTON
GLOBE, Aug. 21, 1993, at 1.
250. See, e.g., Adoptive Parents of M.L.V. v. Wilkens, 598 N.E.2d 1054, 1057 (Ind. 1992);
Boatwright v. Walker, 715 S.W.2d 237, 243 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986); Grafe v. Olds, 556 So. 2d 690,
694 (Miss. 1990); see also ROBERT S. LASNIK, A PARENT'S GUIDE TO ADOPTION 40 (1979) ("A
fraudulently induced consent will be declared null and void by a court even after an adoption has
been finalized.").
251. Stewart v. Goeb, 432 So. 2d 246, 249 (La. 1983) (Dennis, J., concurring).
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ana's Children's Code, which places limits on challenges to an adop-
tion procured by fraud only after the fraud is discovered.
252
"Theoretically, a party who, after seventeen years, discovers that
fraud or duress influenced the adoption decree could then bring an
action to annul it. "253 The fact that such a lawsuit can be brought is
preposterous, particularly when the goal of adoption law is to promote
finality and stability for the child.
Some states do not follow the "discovery rule" but, instead, spec-
ify time limits, usually one year in length, after which an adoption
decision may not be challenged, even if fraud or duress is alleged.254
Similarly, the Uniform Adoption Act limits all challenges to six
months, even if the parent was fraudulently excluded from participat-
ing in the proceedings.255 The problem is that even a six-month pe-
riod may be too long, especially when the time for trial court decisions
and multiple appeals are factored into the equation. For example, if a
parent brings a fraud claim just before this six-month period expires,
by the time the trial judge hears the case and issues a decision, the
child may already have developed too strong a bond with his adoptive
parents to simply be whisked away like a piece of property. "Further-
more, even if the case is decided promptly and correctly by the trial
court, the normal appellate delay may have unsettling and harmful
effects upon the developing relationship between the child and his
psychological parent. ' 256 Moreover, as the Baby Jessica and Baby
252. "No action to annul a final decree of adoption of any type may be brought for any
reason after a lapse of six months from discovery of the fraud or duress." LA. CHULD. CODE
ANN. art. 1263 (emphasis added).
253. Pearce-Reggio, supra note 234, at 1671; see also Teanna W. Neskora, Comment, The
Constitutional Rights of Putative Fathers Recognized in Louisiana's New Children's Code, 52 LA.
L. REv. 1009, 1041 (1992). Oklahoma has a similar problem. That state's statute of limitations
for adoption cases bars challenges brought more than one year after an adoption decree is en-
tered. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 58. The discovery of fraud, however, is an exception that can
toll the statute of limitations. See, e.g., Wade v. Geren, 743 P.2d 1070, 1072-73 (Okla. 1987); Hurt
v. Noble, 817 P.2d 744, 746 (Okla. Ct. App. 1991). Other states also allow fraud to toll the
statute of limitations in adoption cases. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-10A-25(d) (1992); HAW. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 578-12 (Michie 1993).
254. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 25.23.140(b) (1991) (decrees terminating parental rights may
not be challenged, even on grounds of fraud, more than one year after the order is issued); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 453.140 (Vernon 1986) ("After the expiration of one year from the date of entry of
the decree of adoption, the validity thereof shall not be subject to attack in any proceedings,
collateral or direct, by reason of any irregularity in proceedings had pursuant to this chapter");
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 170-B:17 (1994) (final adoption decrees cannot be challenged more
than one year after they are issued, even if fraud is alleged).
255. See UN:w. ADOPTION Acr § 2-401 cmt. ("A person may not challenge an adoption de-
cree more than six months after it is issued, even if the person was thwarted in his ability to
assume parenting responsibilities.").
256. In re J.M.P., 528 So. 2d 1002, 1016 (La. 1988).
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Richard cases illustrate, many custody battles concerning fraud cur-
rently linger in courts for several years, not months.
Therefore, legislative reforms are necessary for two reasons: (1)
to eliminate the ability to commit fraud, and (2) to penalize fraudulent
actors and dissuade others from doing the same. A putative father
registry should achieve the first goal. The state will automatically pro-
vide notice to the father if the mother tries to place the child for adop-
tion. The father can then intervene and assert his rights, rather than
be forced to do so after the child has already been placed with the
adoptive parents. In essence, a registry makes the mother's conduct
irrelevant. Regardless of the man the mother identifies, the actual fa-
ther will be able to protect his rights. This may prevent some adop-
tion disputes involving fraud from ever commencing.257
Of course, measures should be taken to dissuade persons from
perpetrating fraud in the first place. One possible solution is to prose-
cute the fraudulent actor. In the Baby Pete case, after the settlement
between the McDurfees and Daniel Harriman had been reached, An-
gela Harriman was charged with lying under oath when she falsely
identified Marcus Stoddard as the biological father of her baby.258
Although Angela's false statement was made under oath, any fraudu-
lent action should give rise to criminal penalties. Iowa's amended
Adoption Act states that a release of custody form must contain a
notice to the natural parent that a person who "knowingly and inten-
tionally identifies a person who is not the other biological parent in
the written release of custody or in any other document related to the
termination of parental rights proceedings .. .is guilty of a simple
misdemeanor." 259 Alternatively, the Uniform Adoption Act autho-
rizes a civil penalty against a natural parent who knowingly misidenti-
fies the other natural parent with the intent to deceive that parent, the
adoptive parents, or an agency.260
257. See supra note 236 and accompanying text.
258. See, e.g., Judith Gaines, Baby Pete's Mother Charged, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 9, 1993, at
33.
259. IOWA CODE § 600A.4(2)(e) (1995); see also Doe 1, 627 N.E.2d 648, 664 (Il1. App. Ct.
1993) (Tully, P.J., dissenting) (proposing that "severe sanctions" be imposed upon parties and
attorneys who conceal information regarding the natural father's whereabouts), rev'd, 638
N.E.2d 181 (Ill.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 499, and cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 499 (1994).
260. UNiF. ADOPTION AcT § 7-105(f). The comment to that section explains that fraud may
result in legal disputes not unlike those in the Baby Jessica and Baby Richard cases:
This provision may serve to warn birth parents about the harmful consequences for
their children of failing to tell the truth. One such consequence may be the belated
discovery by the other parent of an adoption proceeding, followed by an effort by that




In the final analysis, a child should never be called upon to bear
the burden of an adult's fraudulent conduct. Yet, Jessica and Richard
will spend the rest of their lives shouldering this weighty emotional
burden. The threat of stiff penalties for fraudulent conduct should en-
courage all parties involved in an adoption proceeding to act honestly.
In addition, a putative father registry will protect fathers from con-
cealed births and adoptions and, therefore, should eliminate most
post-birth fraud claims.
CONCLUSION
Several articles were written about Jessica's and Richard's rapid
assimilation into their new homes.261 No one, however, can accurately
predict whether or not each child's long-term development will be ad-
versely affected by what has already transpired:
Whenever biological parents succeed in reclaiming a child after
years of estrangement-after years in a substitute family-the
child's feelings of being wanted and secure are jeopardized. Equally
threatened are many developmental advances which are firmly
rooted in the reciprocal interchange of affection between an imma-
ture dependent being and his familiar adult caretakers.262
Only over a long period of time can one truly evaluate the effect of
these painful ordeals on Jessica and Richard. In order to prevent such
tragic cases from recurring, legislative reforms are critical and should
include at least four components: (1) procedures for expediting adop-
tion hearings and decisions; (2) putative father registries to prevent
postbirth intervention by putative fathers; (3) mandatory preplace-
ment counseling for natural parents; and (4) severe penalties for indi-
viduals who use fraud for their own benefit in adoption cases.
These legislative reforms will protect the interests of all parties
involved in an adoption case. A putative father registry will guarantee
the putative father that he will not be excluded from adoption pro-
ceedings, even if the natural mother or adoptive parents attempt to
fraudulently conceal the adoption. Rapid placement and expedited
decisions will protect the child's best interests by preventing removal
of the child years after placement and bonding have occurred. Finally,
Id. crnt.
261. See, e.g., Jerome & Alexander, supra note 4, at 43 (citing report by psychologist who
visited Richard daily that he was "adapting well to his new environs"); Baby Jessica Adjusts to
Life with Her Biological Parents, ORLANO SENTINEL, Oct. 1, 1993, at A6 ("Baby Jessica is
settling in well with her biological parents," according to therapists.); Baby Jessica is Calling
Biological Father "Daddy", ORLANDO SENTINEL, Sept. 15, 1993, at As.
262. GoLusTEIN ET AL, supra note 184, at 54.
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mandatory counseling will ensure that all parties involved make deci-
sions with informed consent. These adoption reforms are necessary
because "U]ustice delayed is justice denied-slow justice is no jus-
tice. ' 263 Regrettably, the Baby Jessica, Baby Richard and Baby Emily
cases plainly illustrate the truth of this statement.
263. In re BJB, 888 P.2d 216, 220 (Wyo. 1995) (Cardine, J., dissenting).
1995)

